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The investigative detention doctrine first announced in Terry v. Ohio
and amplified over the past fifty years has been much analyzed, praised,
and criticized from a number of perspectives. Significantly, however,
over this time period commentators have only occasionally questioned
the Supreme Court's "common sense "judgments regarding the factors
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for stops and frisks. For
years, the Court has provided no empirical basis for its judgments, due
in large part to the lack of reliable data. Now, with the emergence of
comprehensive data on these police practices, much can be learned
about the predictive power of suspect conduct and other predicates for
law enforcement interventions. And what has been learned calls into
question a number of factors that have been cited in reasonable
suspicion analyses over many years.
No observer of the legal system can fail to notice the growing role of
data and empirical analysis in the courts. A disparate set of cases have
turned in large part on rigorously analyzed data. Yet this trend has not
taken root in an important set of cases involving the widely used
practice of stop and frisk. When stop-and-frisk practices become the
subject of litigation, courts generally either have no data to review or
have failed to engage in empirical analysis of the data that are available
and which could be used to test the claims of reasonable suspicion.
Rather, the courts invoke the conventional wisdom that as a matter of
common sense certain conduct, for example, furtive movement, flight,
bulges in clothing, and suspect location, indicates criminal conduct.
We have no argument with common sense propositions; we have no
aversion to clear, straightforward thinking. But what this phrase often
reflects is a set of unexamined (even if widely held) assumptions. The
prolhferation of data on these basic questions provides the means for
empirical analysis, and it is our argument that courts should use this
newly available data in assessing reasonable suspicion factors in the
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same manner that they have engaged in empiricaljudgments, using both
big and targeted data, in other areas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio in 1968,' it
created new constitutional rules to govern long-standing practices in American
policing. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, fully applicable to the
states since 1961,2 required that officers have probable cause to suspect a person
of involvement in a crime in order for police to conduct any search or seizure.
Yet officers on the street had continued to focus on people who simply looked
suspicious, perhaps for a concrete reason or just because of an officer's gut
feeling, and police had stopped these people, refused to let them go, and
searched them-sometimes with less than probable cause, and sometimes with
no basis whatsoever. 3 For example, New York State permitted police to stop
people and perform cursory searches, with less than probable cause but
requiring some level of fact-based suspicion.4
I Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
3 E.g., REMO FRANCESCHINI, A MATTER OF HONOR 35-36 (1993) (discussing the
common practice of "giv[ing] him a toss": stopping and detaining a person on a hunch and
going through the person's pockets and possessions in search of evidence or weapons).4 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a, at issue in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,43-44
(1968), provides in full:
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or any of the
offenses specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand of
him his name, address and an explanation of his actions. -
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Terry was the Supreme Court's opportunity to assess these practices. The
Court would decide whether, as the defense in the case argued, all police-
enforced stops, however temporary, and all searches, however cursory, required
that police have probable cause,5 or whether a temporary stop and a frisk
amounted to "a mere 'minor inconvenience and petty indignity"' which could
be based on any suspicion by a police officer.6
The Court declined to adopt either of these opposing positions and limited
its ruling to the question of the grounds required for a frisk of the suspect. A
hunch or a gut feeling about possible criminal conduct would not suffice; an
officer needed to have facts, and inferences drawn from them, that would raise
a suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer that the person under observation
was armed and dangerous. If this standard was satisfied, the officer could
perform a frisk-a limited pat down of the suspect's outer clothing-in order to
avoid the danger posed by a weapon.7 Justice Harlan's concurrence emphasized
that the use of stop and frisks constituted a two-step process, and likewise
required a two-step analysis.8 The officer would need reasonable suspicion that
crime was afoot, but this alone would not necessarily support a frisk.9 The frisk
would require reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous.10
By the same token, the police could not justify a frisk unless reasonable
suspicion first existed that would allow a temporary stop.I'
The Terry opinion told the story of how the defendant and two other men
came to be observed, stopped, frisked, and then arrested in downtown Cleveland
by Officer McFadden, a veteran police officer.1 2 McFadden, having patrolled
the downtown beat for decades, noticed two of the men walking up and down
the same short stretch of a city block, pausing to stare into the same jewelry
store window; the men did this, first one man, then the other, twenty-four times
in all.13 At the end of each trip up and back, they conferred on a nearby corner,
and were sometimes joined by the third man, who quickly walked away.14
Observing all of this, McFadden suspected that the men were "casing a job, a
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section
and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person
for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the
possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion
of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest
such person.
5 Terry, 392 U.S. at 11-12.6 1d. at 10-11 (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (N.Y. 1964)).
7 1d at 19 n.16, 27.81d at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
9 1d. at 30 (majority opinion); id at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
101d at 30 (majority opinion); id at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
11 Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).12 1d. at 6-7 (majority opinion).
I3 Id at 6.
I14 Id.
5032018]1
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
stick-up"-in other words, performing reconnaissance for a planned armed
robbery of the store.15 McFadden stopped them, asked some questions, and then
frisked suspect Terry-locating a gun. 16 He found another gun on one of the
other men as well, and arrested them both.17 This sort of police work, the Court
said, constituted exactly the correct process: an officer, looking at the behavior
of the suspects and interpreting what all of it meant, would have reasonable,
fact-based suspicion to temporarily detain and question them, and then (because
an armed robbery seemed to be the goal) to frisk them for weapons.18
By taking the facts as central to its conclusion that Officer McFadden had
performed in exactly the way that would comply with the new Terry standard,
the Court made clear an important concept: the reasonable suspicion
determination turns in large part on the predictive value of a range of conduct
and information made known to an officer. Based on this inference-in essence,
making a prediction that the men, walking back and forth repeatedly with
particular attention to a jewelry store's display window, had plans for an
immediate robbery of the store-McFadden may have intuited correctly.1 9 But
a reviewing court operating under Terry need not necessarily find that the
prediction was correct in order for the actions of the police to pass muster.
Rather, the prediction, based on the observed facts and circumstances and the
inferences McFadden could draw, need only have been reasonable. 20
Over the run of cases decided since Terry, the Court has put very little meat
on the bones of the analysis necessary for determining the sufficiency of the
predictive value in a particular cluster of facts to constitute reasonable suspicion.
What substance the Court has supplied has come largely in the form of the ever-
ready, ever-malleable phrase "common sense." 21 The Court instructs us to take
a nontechnical, everyday lay person's common sense view of the facts to
ascertain whether the officer possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion
necessary to perform a Terry stop and frisk. For example, in United States v.
15 Id
16Id at 7.
17 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
1 81d at 27-28.
19 The Terry Court acknowledged the possibility that racial bias could affect stop-and-
frisk practices but apparently did not think the problem serious enough to restrict this
practice. Some commentators addressed this issue and as later litigation and studies would
show, see infra Part IV.D, racial bias is a serious matter. See Adina Schwartz, "Just Take
Away Their Guns": The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317, 323-
24 (1996).
20 Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 ("[Officer McFadden] had observed enough to make it quite
reasonable to fear that [the suspects] were armed; and nothing in their response[s] ... served
to dispel that reasonable belief. We cannot say that [Officer McFadden's] decision at that
point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons was the product of a volatile or inventive
imagination . . . .").2 1Infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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Cortez,22 the Court stated a theme that echoes in many of its stop-and-frisk
cases:
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.
Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people
formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as
factfinders are permitted to do the same-and so are law enforcement
officers.... [T]he evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in
terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the
field of law enforcement. 23
The Court avoids empirical reasoning with respect to what meets the legal
standard; rather, it looks at the question of whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion through the experienced eyes of the police officer on patrol, with
minimal consideration of whether these judgments are based on proven, reliable
factors. 24 Further, the Court gives substantial deference to an officer's judgment
based on the supposition that her experience provides unique expertise.2 5
We do not write to oppose common sense or the usefulness of experience
in decision-making. Neither of us have any aversion to clear, straightforward
thinking. Rather, we believe that common sense as that concept informs the
Court's criminal justice jurisprudence often means something different than
what it sounds like: not obvious, homespun, solid judgment, but unexamined
assumptions with which many people may agree (and which may be
problematically reinforced by the fact that incriminating evidence was actually
seized). However, wide-spread belief in the truth of what may seem obvious is
not the same thing as actual proof. And where there is empirical data that can
substantiate or call into question the predictive value of these "common sense"
facts, it is our view that courts should adjust their perceptions accordingly.
In this Article, we will use empirical data to examine assumptions about the
predictive value of observed facts in the context of the Terry stop-and-frisk
jurisprudence. In a world where data and empiricism are becoming important
metrics for determining the efficacy and reliability of a vast array of legal,
scientific, and social science standards, including the use of data and algorithms
in criminal justice decision-making, "common sense" resolutions may no longer
be justified. Our project is informed by the growing literature examining the
possibilities and implications of so-called "big data" and on the use of predictive
analytics and algorithmic predictions for public safety and law enforcement.
We seek to answer the question of whether statistically driven analysis
makes stop and frisk more efficient and fairer by paving the way to more
productive stops, fewer encounters, and a reduction in racial and ethnic bias. In
doing so, we make a modest claim: given the growing availability and use of
22 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
2 3 1d. at 418; see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-25 (2000).
2 4 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-25; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
2 5 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-25; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
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data in criminal justice, courts should consider data in deciding whether to
accept the empirically testable claims by police and other criminal justice actors,
instead of relying upon content-free, unsubstantiated assertions of "common
sense." And we conclude that the disturbingly low hit rates for weapons and
other contraband in police frisks calls into question many of the court-approved
justifications for this invasive police practice.
We proceed as follows. In Part II, we examine the Terry doctrine in greater
depth, and in particular its concept of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment. Part III discusses the emergence of "big data" and empiricism. Part
IV brings us to what data analysis and empiricism have been able to tell us about
stop-and-frisk practices, beginning with a discussion of how the availability of
data and empirical judgments has grown in the law generally, with a focus on
voting rights and the Supreme Court's most recent case on abortion restrictions.
Part V brings us to the heart of our argument: what data and empirical analysis
can tell us about frisks, why courts must make use of data analysis instead of
unexamined "common sense" assumptions, and what our analysis of predictive
values and metrics means for the criminal law and for policing.
II. THE TERRY DOCTINE
In Terry v. Ohio the United States Supreme Court ruled that a person who
was stopped for investigation by the police could be frisked if the officer had
reasonable suspicion that the person was "armed and dangerous." 26 The Court
had not previously authorized a seizure or search of a person on less than
probable cause, but by focusing on the Fourth Amendment's proscription of
"unreasonable" searches or seizures, the Court determined that probable cause
was not necessary given the limited intrusion into personal privacy posed by a
stop and frisk. 27 While Terry did not directly involve the issue of the permissible
grounds for a "stop," the Court's opinions made clear that it was approving
forcible stops of persons based upon "reasonable suspicion" of involvement in
serious criminal conduct.28
The Supreme Court has expanded the Terry doctrine in several significant
respects. First, the Court has permitted stops (and consequently possible frisks)
of all persons who are reasonably suspected of any criminal activity, including
possessory offenses, traffic violations, and "quality of life" summary offenses,
thus significantly widening the scope of this practice. 29 These cases rejected
arguments that expanding stop and frisk beyond investigations of violent and
26 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30 (1968).27 Id at 21, 25, 29-31.28 1d at 29-31; see also id at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring); id at 34-35 (White, J.,
concurring); id at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court expressly adopted this doctrine in
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).2 9 See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014); Arizona v. Johnson,
555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275-77 (2002); Wardlow,
528 U.S. at 124; Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-48.
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other serious crimes would lead to arbitrary and excessive enforcement
practices. 30 This development coincided with an era of proactive and order-
maintenance policing that has generated broad debate regarding "broken
windows," "zero tolerance," and "quality of life" policing methods.3 1 Designed
to prevent serious crime and disorder by punishing even minor deviances, these
controversial practices have become a mainstay of modem policing.
30Judge Friendly argued against applying stop and frisk in nonviolent crime
investigations. See Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); see
also Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring); Richard E. Myers II, Challenges to Terry
for the Twenty-First Century, 81 Miss. L.J. 937, 943 (2012); Carol S. Steiker, Terry
Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 335 (2013). Data from jurisdictions that document investigatory
stops show that the majority of these stops (and frisks) are for nonviolent offenses. See Floyd
v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Plaintiffs' Seventh Report
to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment Issues at 19, Bailey
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2017) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Seventh
Report to Court]; Plaintiffs' Sixth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices:
Fourth Amendment Issues at 19, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
22, 2016) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Sixth Report to Court]; Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L.
Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CI. L. REV. 809, 819 (2011)
(only 20% of arrests following stops in New York City were for felony investigations).
31 There is a vast literature on these issues, much of which is responsive to the early
writings of James Q. Wilson. See JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 39-40
(1968); George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/
30 4465/ [https://perma.
cc/SZ8B-VFB4]. For a sample of responses that discuss stop-and-frisk practices in the context
of proactive policing, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER (2001); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK'S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS
CONTROL (2012); Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and
Effectiveness of New York City "Stop and Frisk," 94 B.U. L. REv. 1495, 1504-05 (2014);
John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An
Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 224-25, 228-45 (Alfred
Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000); David F. Greenberg, Studying New York City's
Crime Decline: Methodological Issues, 31 JUST. Q. 154, 155 (2014); Rachel A. Harmon &
Andrew Manns, Proactive Policing and the Legacy of Terry, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 49
(2017); Andrew Ingram, Breaking Laws To Fix Broken Windows: A Revisionist Take on
Order Maintenance Policing, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 132-33 (2014); Steven D.
Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline
and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 172-73 (2004); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard
E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 779 (2000); Tracey
L. Meares, The Law and Social Science ofStop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 335,
339-43 (2014); David Rudovsky, Debate: Opening Statement, Stop-and Frisk: The Power
ofData and the Decision in Floyd v. City of New York, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 118
(2013); David Weisburd et al., Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New
York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength?: The Case of Stop,
Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, 31 JUST. Q. 129, 131-32 (2014); and
John MacDonald et al., The Effects of Local Police Surges on Crime and Arrests in New
York City, Article in PLoS One, PLOS 2 (2016), httpz//journals.plos.org/plosonelarticle/file?id=
10.1371fjoumal.pone.0157223&type-printable [https//perma.cc/lRXT5-4TEG].
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Second, the Court has approved stops and frisks on the assumption that
certain conduct is predictive of or associated with criminal behavior and weapon
possession, but has not required an empirical basis for these judgments, many
of which rest on conduct that is entirely consistent with innocence.32 The Court
has repeatedly stated that it would apply "common sense"judgments and permit
officers to make reasonable inferences from a suspect's behavior in determining
whether there were legal grounds for a stop and frisk.33 Thus, in ilinois v.
Wardlow, the Court permitted a stop and frisk where the suspect fled from police
in a high-crime area even though it had no data showing that persons who fled
from the police in high-crime areas were reasonably likely to be involved in
criminal conduct.34 And while the Court has cautioned against use of
characteristics that would permit frequent stops of a "very large category of
presumably innocent travelers," 35 its cases over the years have provided police
with vast stop-and-frisk discretion, permitting stops and frisks on vague and
subjective standards such as nervousness, officer experience, furtive movements
and suspicious activity.36 This approach is similar to that followed by some
32 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (finding that conduct
that appears to be innocent may still provide reasonable suspicion based on the "totality of
the circumstances").
3 3 See, e.g., id (discussing stop of car for immigration investigation based on location
and reactions of occupants to police presence); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981) ("[C]ommon sense conclusions about human behavior. . . weighed not in terms of
librat analysis by scholars, but as understood by . .. law enforcement.").
4 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25. As we discuss, infra note 64 and accompanying text,
there was data that contradicted the Court's analysis. See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 31,
at 790 (citing New York State Attorney General's Report on stop-and-frisk practice in New
York City where only one in forty-five stops made on flight in a high-crime area resulted in
an arrest). Moreover, as Justice Stevens stated in his dissent, innocent residents of minority
neighborhoods might have good reason to avoid contacts with the police. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
at 132-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).3 5 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam).3 6 See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494, 502 (1983)
(plurality opinion) (noting nervousness as a factor contributing to a finding of reasonable
suspicion); United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding
suspect's evasive or erratic movements are part of the totality of the circumstances); United
States v. Logan, 526 F. App'x 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (presence in a high-crime area);
United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309,314 (6th Cir. 2009) (sitting in a car for an extended period
may add to reasonable suspicion); United States v. Himmelwright, 406 F. Supp. 889, 892-
93 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (finding suspect's "unusually calm" demeanor supported the finding of
reasonable suspicion), aff'd, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1977); Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113
MICH. L. REV. 461, 505 (2015). On the question of the relevancy and characteristics of a
"high-crime area," see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem
as a nail, so a man with a badge may see every corner of his beat as a high crime area."), and
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing "High-
Crime Areas, " 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 181 (2011); see also DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE
47-52 (1999) (surveying airport drug courier profile stops that were based on virtually all
characteristics of passenger travel).
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courts in assessing airport "drug courier profiles." As recounted by Professor
Barry Friedman, the Drug Enforcement Agency and other law enforcement
organizations used passenger behavior-often entirely innocent and often
inconsistent-in their interdiction efforts. Thus, people were considered
couriers if they "arrived at night [or] early in the morning," were "[o]ne of the
first to deplane[, o]ne of the last to deplane[, or d]eplaned in the middle," "[u]sed
a one-way ticket [or] a round-trip ticket," "[t]raveled alone [or] with a
companion," "[a]cted too nervous [or] too calm," etc.37 Not surprisingly, when
the full data set, as opposed to the very occasional successful stop, was
examined, there was "less than a 2% hit rate" for persons carrying drugs.3 8
Use of vague and indeterminate standards has been rejected in other
contexts. The Court has ruled that vague statutory language such as "vagrancy,"
"loitering," and "suspicious conduct" is not a valid ground for arrest and
prosecution under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 39 More recently, the Court
struck down as too indeterminate the "residual clause" of the Armed Career
Criminal Act that punished unenumerated crimes by their likeness to specific
criminal acts.4 0 The Court has also extended the vagueness doctrine to other
contexts, including standards for imposing costs on criminal defendants,4 1 rules
regulating the bar,42 and agency regulations.43
Yet, the Court has failed to explain why the maxim that "[n]o one should
have to ponder the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether
3 7 BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 152-53 (2017).
The Supreme Court did not validate drug courier profiles as grounds for a stop, but did permit
the various factors to be part of the overall determination of the "evidentiary significance as
seen by a trained agent." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
3 8 FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 153.
3 9 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 361 (1983) (finding requirement that
detained person provide "credible and reliable" identification is void for vagueness because
law must provide "ordinary people" with notice to "understand what conduct is prohibited"
so as to avoid "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness);
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (holding loitering prohibition
void for vagueness); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (explaining definiteness is needed to prevent "the net to be cast at large, to enable
men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution, although
not chargeable with any particular offense"); Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d
1147, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding law prohibiting use of cars as "living quarters" void
for vagueness); Stahl v. City of St. Louis, 687 F.3d 1038, 1040-41 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding
conduct that "impede[s] traffic" is too vague a standard); Note, The Void-for- Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 73-75 (1960).
40 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557-58 (2015); cf Beckles v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894-95 (2017) (rejecting similar challenge to sentencing guidelines).
41 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966).
42 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-51 (1991).
43 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317-20 (2012).
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his conduct is a felony,"44 which precludes prosecutions based on vague
statutes, does not apply to forcible stops and frisks of individuals. Indeed, there
is good reason to believe that the investigative-detention rationale of Terry has
become a substitute for vague loitering and vagrancy laws and has provided
police with an even broader policing power.45 The vagueness of the factors that
may justify stops and frisks increases the risk that police will act on biases in
deciding whether there is sufficient suspicion for forcible intervention. Thus, if
police associate racial minorities with criminal conduct where the same actions
by whites are not regarded as suspicious, or if they consider race or ethnicity as
surrogates for criminal conduct, even on a subconscious level, bias may become
a causative factor. 46 For this reason alone, courts should scrutinize the reasons
provided for stops and frisks to ensure that they have predictive value on the
issue of "reasonable suspicion," and where empirical evidence bears on this
question, should use that evidence in the constitutional calculus.
Third, stop-and-frisk doctrine has developed primarily as a function of the
exclusionary rule, which means that the cases in which courts adjudicate the
issue are those in which contraband or other evidence of criminal conduct has
already been uncovered in the investigative detention. In this context, fact-
finding and legal analysis can be compromised by false or misleading police
officer testimony and the court's reluctance to suppress otherwise probative
evidence.47 Indeed, where evidence of a crime is uncovered in a stop-and-frisk
4Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2097 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2543 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(asserting that abortion protesters should not be subject to seizure based on an offense of
"follow[ing] and harass[ing]" (alterations in original)).4 5 See Tracey Meares, This LandIs My Land?, 130 HARV. L. REv. 1877, 1880 (2017)
(book review).
46 There is a growing body of literature, judicial rulings, and studies regarding the
concept of implicit bias. See, e.g., United States v. Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546, 553 (3d
Cir. 2017) (using arrest records for sentencing impermissible); REBECCA C. HETEY ET AL.,
STANFORD SPARQ, DATA FOR CHANGE 33 (2016); Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion
and Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 415-17
(2005); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias 's Failure, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4-5); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race,
Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 876, 889-91 (2004);
Kent Greenawalt, Commentary, Probabilities, Perceptions, Consequences and
"Discrimination ": One Puzzle About Controversial "Stop and Frisk," 12 OHIO ST. J. CUM.
L. 181, 182-84 (2014); Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126
YALE L.J.F. 406, 415 (2017); Myers, supra note 30, at 954-55; L. Song Richardson, Arrest
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REv. 2035, 2037-39 (2011) [hereinafter
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency]; L. Song Richardson, Implicit RacialBias andRacialAnxiety:
Implications for Stops and Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73, 75-88 (2017); Rob Voigt et
al., Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer
Respect, 114 PNAS 6521, 6524 (2017).4 7 See, e.g., Bernard Chao et al., Why Courts Fail To Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias,
and Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REv. 263, 279-86 (2018) (discussing judges' reluctance to
suppress incriminating evidence because of hindsight bias); David N. Dorfinan, Proving the
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encounter, the weapon or drugs or other evidence provides a kind of "self-
validating" reason for an officer's intervention.48
Similar criticisms can be made of the Court's "probable cause"
jurisprudence, as the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard also involves
inferential judgments from facts that may be innocent in nature. Probable cause
requires a showing of a "fair probability" that the suspect has committed a crime
or that evidence will be found at a certain location.49 The courts have not
quantified the probability standard, but judges and commentators have
suggested a 35-50% probability of criminal conduct.50 Reasonable suspicion is
satisfied by "considerably less" proof of wrongdoing than a preponderance of
the evidence, 5 1 and some commentators have suggested a significantly lower
range.52
The differences in assessing probabilities, however, are more than one of
mere degree. Probable cause analysis is usually anchored to a specific,
completed criminal act and the police investigation is based on information
provided by witnesses, personal observations by the police, forensics, and
culpable behavior of the suspect.53 Accordingly, in most cases there are
Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 458-65 (1999) (discussing both
"exclusion of illegally obtained evidence" and false police testimony); Stanley Z. Fisher,
"Just the Facts Ma'am": Lying and the Omission ofExculpatory Evidence in Police Reports,
28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 9-12 (1993); Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial
Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 787, 790-94 (2001)
(discussing police perjury); Myers, supra note 30, at 965-66; Christopher Slobogin,
Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1041 (1996)
(discussing the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence through the exclusionary
rule).
48 Occasionally, courts expressly recognize the pressures to validate searches that
uncover evidence, regardless of the Fourth Amendment limitations. See, e.g., United States
v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Appeals based on the Fourth Amendment
from denied motions to suppress evidence of illegal weapons or contraband (drugs, etc.) are
often difficult because the Government is in a sense proven right. Whatever prompted the
search (a hunch, suspicion, luck, reasonable belief, or probable cause), incriminating
evidence was found.").
49 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).
50 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34-35, 47-48 (2000) (finding
invalid under Fourth Amendment, highway drug checkpoint that resulted in a 7.4% drugs-
related arrest rate, and 8.96% overall arrest rate); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)
(holding probable cause does not require proof by a preponderance of the evidence);
Bambauer, supra note 36, at 468; Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable
Cause, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 131, 131-32, 132 n.6 (Michael
Klarman et al. eds., 2012); Kit Kinports, The Dog Days ofFourth Amendment Jurisprudence,
108 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 64, 68 (2013); Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into
Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REv. 913, 925 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Probable
Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 86-88 (2011);
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 46, at 2075-77.
51 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
52 Greenawalt, supra note 46, at 187; Rudovsky, supra note 31, at 119.
53 Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-46.
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relatively clear factors on which a court can determine the "fair probability" of
guilt standard. If a robbery has been committed, the description of the suspect,
method of flight, and other distinguishing factors can be assessed. Similarly,
where police are searching for evidence, the reliability of a witness or informant,
the personal observations of the officer, as well as other information related to
the specific crime or evidence will determine whether probable cause exists. 54
Some stops are based on similar, if less detailed factors (e.g., report of recent
robbery with description of suspect), but more often the reasonable suspicion
analysis rests solely on observed behavior of the suspect.55 The discretion given
to the police in assessing what is "suspicious" conduct is far more malleable
than the discretion exercised in the probable cause context. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the hit rates for stops and frisks (where police actually seize
weapons or contraband, effectuate an arrest, or issue a summons) are
substantially lower than for arrests or searches conducted on full probable
cause.56
To date, courts have rarely employed an "evidence based" approach to
police stop, frisk, or search practices. 57 But with newly emerging
5 4 Id
55 See, e.g, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977) (per curiam); infra note 255 and accompanying text.56 See infra note 89 and accompanying text. Indeed, where police have engaged in
random stops without any particularized suspicion, for example at highway checkpoints, the
hit rates have in some cases been higher than hit rates for stops and frisks where police are
supposedly acting on objective evidence of suspicious conduct. City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000) (noting drug checkpoint yielded drug seizures in 4.7% of
stops); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Terry's Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 54-55 (2016);
Minzner, supra note 50, at 925.
57 See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 501-02; Chao et al., supra note 47, at 276-79; Lee
Epstein et al., Foreword: Testing the Constitution, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1001, 1017-18, 1023-
24 (2015); David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond
New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 853, 861-62 (2013). Scholarly analysis
and critiques of the Terry doctrine that have been published without reference to this data
have ranged from high accolades, e.g, John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases:
A Look Inside the Supreme Court's Conference, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 749, 839 (1998)
("Many thus think of Terry ... as a . .. sensible balancing of public interests in law
enforcement against relatively lesser intrusions on personal freedom . . . ."); I. Bennett
Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle,
46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 30-35 (2011); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth
Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling, and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 851, 884-89 (2002); Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 46, at 2059-72;
Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio,
43 TEx. TECH L. REV. 299, 325-30 (2010); and Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A
Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 911, 952-62 (1998), to strong criticism,
e.g., Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities,
12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 59-66 (2014); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1994); Scott E. Sundby,
An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and Slobogin, 72 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 1133, 1134 (1998).
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comprehensive and reliable data sets, there is an opening to new perspectives
on Fourth Amendment issues, including the scope of the programs, analysis of
compliance performance, and "hit rates," all of which are critical to the
development of reliable standards for balancing public safety with privacy and
personal dignity.58
III. THE EMERGENCE OF BIG DATA AND EMPIRICISM
Over the last decade, a new phrase has emerged: big data. The idea is that
there now exists an almost inexhaustible stream of data concerning a wide array
of human activities-business and commercial, financial, scientific, medical,
industrial, governmental, and social. Using powerful analytical computing, we
can examine these vast troves of data to discover patterns that might otherwise
remain hidden.
The criminal justice system is capable of generating substantial data, from
the earliest phases of an investigation and proactive policing tactics through
final adjudications, sentencing, and parole and probation. With these data,
scholars from multiple disciplines have begun to examine the potential, the
pitfalls, and the contradictions to existing practice that analysis provides. More
specifically, data collection on police stops of pedestrians over the past fifteen
to twenty years has led to research and studies on the relationship of the data to
doctrinal issues in stop-and-frisk practices. 59
Even before "big data" became a central focus point, Professors Tracey
Meares and Bernard Harcourt addressed the problem of "common sense"
judgments and the predictive value of human behavior.60 In particular, they were
critical of Supreme Court assertions of fact, rarely supported by data analysis-
they called them "pseudo-empirical statements" 6 1-about consequential and
case determinative issues. Rather, "these are . .. purely rhetorical statements
intended to render authoritative the Court's decisions." 62 As an example, in
Illinois v. Wardlow,63 Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded the empirical nature of
the question of whether flight from a police officer raises reasonable suspicion
of wrongdoing, given the many other legitimate reasons to flee from an officer
but stated that in the absence of "empirical studies dealing with inferences
5 8 For example, in New York City, from 2004 to 2012, the police made 4.4 million
pedestrian stops. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). In
Philadelphia, there were approximately 253,000 stops in 2009, Plaintiffs' Third Report to
Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 4, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-
5952 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Third Report to Court], 204,000 in
2011, Plaintiffs' Second Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 13,
Bailey, No. 10-5952 (July 2012), and 215,000 in 2012, Plaintiffs' Third Report to Court,
supra, at 4.
59 See infra Part IV.D.60 Meares & Harcourt, supra note 31, at 784.
6 11d at 739.
62 Id at 740.
63 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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drawn from suspicious behavior," the Court need do no more than look to its
own "commonsense judgements and inferences about human behavior."M
Meares and Harcourt argued that courts cannot justify an approach that
ignores "contested empirical claims that are hotly debated in legal and social
scientific circles" 65 and for which data and studies exist that could help to
resolve the debates. They proposed "a mode of judicial decision-making and
academic debate that treats social scientific and empirical assessment as a
crucial element in constitutional decision-making . . . ."66
With the advent of big data, even more attention is being paid to potential
uses (and abuses) of data mining and empirical determinations. For example,
Professor Ric Simmons has expressed faith in the ability of "predictive
algorithms" to "revolutionize" the criminal justice system. 67 Algorithms will do
this by, among other things, making "far more accurate determinations of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause." 68 This will increase both
efficiency-police will spend time and energy much more selectively, on a more
promising set of targets-and also fairness, because "fewer innocent people will
be stopped and searched." 69
In the same vein, Professor Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, one of the most
prolific scholars of big data and criminal justice, asks: What if big data analytics
could replace the typical "small data"-that is, observable actions and activities
of individuals-upon which police now rely to decide whether they believe
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists?70 Ferguson promotes the use of
networked data sources, as this will increase knowledge and will allow for more
accurate and targeted judgments of whether police have reasonable suspicion.7 '
Now, "[w]ith little effort," Ferguson says, "officers can now identify most
unknown suspects, not through their observations, but by accessing a web of
information containing extensive personal data about suspects." 72
64Id at 124-25. As Meares and Harcourt noted, there was empirical data that called
into question the inferential judgments that the Court made about flight in a high-crime area.
Meares & Harcourt, supra note 31, at 790.6 5 Meares & Harcourt, supra note 31, at 750-51.6 6 Id at 735.
6 7 Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How To Unlock the Potential ofBig
Data in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REv. 947, 1016 (2016).
6 8 Id at 947.
69 Id
70 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 327, 350-51 (2015) [hereinafter Ferguson, Big Data]; see also ANDREW
GuTHRIEi FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING 2 (2017).7 1 Id. at 360-65.
72 Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 70, at 329-30. In a similar vein, Professor Andrew
Manuel Crespo argues that data analytics can improve the criminal justice process in a more
big-picture way: by bringing broad institutional contours into focus. Andrew Manuel Crespo,
Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV.
2049, 2053 (2016). As currently structured, the system of constitutional criminal procedure,
in particular its one-off, one-case-at-a-time nature, impedes any attempt to understand the
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Both Simmons and Ferguson present uses of big data that could make the
system fairer, but both recognize troubling issues. Simmons prudently warns of
"obstacles" to overcome, first and foremost attaining the assurance that neither
the algorithms nor the data rely on "improper factors, such as the race of the
suspect." 73 He also cautions that predictive algorithms must still take
individualized suspicion into account, and that the legal standard must be
quantified-something the Supreme Court has resisted.74 Ferguson's proposal
for making known an unknown suspect relies on an ability to identify the person,
for example through biometric identification like facial recognition. 75 But
sufficiently accurate facial recognition is a ways off, and other types of
biometric identification, for example fingerprint or retina scans, which seem
closest to field deployment, would require a seizure of the individual, and that
would require reasonable suspicion.
In other works on the subject,76 Ferguson recognizes that big data and its
predictions necessitate a careful understanding of the technology, because some
flaws, while invisible, are baked into the finished product.77 In other words, if
the data reflect actions that have their bases in biased policing practices, the data
will carry this forward, in the guise of clean, neutral metrics. While big-data-
based predictive policing "has been promoted as a data-driven, race neutral,
objective solution to the failed policing policies of the past," 78 Ferguson says, it
deserves a sustained examination and critique that scrutinizes the collection of
system or to regulate the actors in it from a systemic point of view. The nature of the system
"den[ies] courts an opportunity to 'see' the systemic features of law enforcement behavior,"
creating a "mismatch" between courts' "institutional task and their institutional capacity."
Id. at 2050. Other commentators have urged similar use of data relevant to particular aspects
of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Chao et al. supra note 47, at 318; Mary D. Fan,
Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police Regulation by Data-
Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REv. 93, 125-30 (2012); Pamela Metzger & Andrew
Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REv. 1057, 1061-62 (2015).
73 Simmons, supra note 67, at 947. Other commentators have made similar arguments
regarding the integrity of algorithms. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Other People's Papers, 94
TEx. L. REv. 205, 253-57,253 n.247 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and
the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REv. 803, 805-06 (2014); see
also Rebecca Wexler, Opinion, When a Computer Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y. TIMES
(June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-are-harming-
criminal-justice.htnl (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (discussing problem of assertions
of confidentiality of proprietary information that block challenges to probabilistic algorithms
used in sentencing and parole decisions).
74 Simmons, supra note 67, at 987.
75 Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 70, at 330.
76 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REv. 1109
(2017) [hereinafter Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing]; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259 (2012) [hereinafter
Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion].
77 Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 76, at 314.
78 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing: Abstract, SSRN (Apr. 18,
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract-2765525 [https://perma.cc/4Q6N-SXUU].
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data, the methodology used, transparency, accountability, and implementation,
at the very least.79 Moreover, even with full data sets, there can be serious
disputes over analysis and predictive accuracy. For example, in a 2003 opinion
upholding an Alaska sex offender registration law, Justice Kennedy relied on a
Department of Justice (DOJ) study to assert that the risk of re-offending among
sex offenders is "frightening and high."80 But it turns out that this assertion,
which has been repeated in lower court cases since that decision, was based on
single source in a compendium of papers reviewed by the DOJ that claimed up
to an 80% re-offending rate.81 Recent research shows that this figure, taken from
an article in Psychology Today, is highly dubious and most likely false; to the
contrary, sex offenders re-offend at much lower rates.82
But whatever the merits and limits of big data, there is good reason to
examine even more limited data sets reflecting specific police practices. In a
series of articles, Professor Sharad Goel and various colleagues employ data
analysis to suggest ways in which stop-and-frisk practices can be fairer, rarer,
and more productive. 83 Using data from New York City's Stop, Question and
Frisk program, these scholars show how "a particular kind of calculation made
possible by modern, large-scale datasets-determining the likelihood that
stopping and frisking a particular pedestrian will result in the discovery of
contraband .. . could be used to reduce the racially disparate impact of
pedestrian searches and to increase their effectiveness." 84 Thus, the data show
79 See Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 76, at 1144-87; see also
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 871, 878-79 (2016) (finding that automated suspicion
algorithms do not fit well into existing Fourth Amendment doctrine, so accuracy and
effectiveness must be assured through "extrajudicial means").
80 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34
(2002)).
811d. See generally RAYMOND C. BROwN & JOHN E. MOORE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE To TREATING THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER xiii (1988)
("[T]he recidivism rate of untreated [sex] offenders is around 80%.").82 Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, "Frightening and High": The Supreme Court's
Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 495-508 (2015);
Melissa Hamilton, Briefing the Supreme Court: Promoting Science or Myth?, 67 EMORY L.J.
ONLINE 2021, 2022-23, 2022 n.5 (2017); Melissa Hamilton, Essay, Constitutional Law and
the Role of Scientific Evidence: The Transformative Potential of Doe v. Snyder, 58 B.C. L.
REv. E. SuPP. 34, 39 (2017); Adam Liptak, Did the Supreme Court Base a Ruling on a
Myth?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/supreme-
court-repeat-sex-offenders.htmi (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).83 Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age ofBig Data, 20 NEW
CRIM. L. REv. 181, 188 (2017) [hereinafter Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination];
Sharad Goel et al., Personalized Risk Assessments in the Criminal Justice System, 106 AM.
ECON. REv. 119, 119-23 (2016) [hereinafter Goel et al., Personalized Risk Assessments];
Sharad Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding Racial Disparities in New York
City's Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANNALS OF APPLIED STAT. 365, 383 (2016) [hereinafter
Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice?].84 Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 83, at 181.
516 [Vol. 79:3
TERRY STOPS-AND-FRISKS
that around 40% of the stops made by the police in New York City in the period
studied were based on observations or other factors that had only a 1% chance
of finding a weapon, usually a knife, and that police have used these low-
percentage stops disproportionately on blacks and Latinos.85 By contrast, where
more reliable factors were the basis of stops, it was determined that 6% of all
stops were far more likely to result in the discovery of weapons, and
simultaneously to mitigate racial disparities. 86
Professor Ferguson and Professor Damien Bernache capture the idea in the
context of another claim based on resort to common sense reasoning: police
testimony that a particular location constitutes a high-crime area.87 Using the
Wardlow case as a prototypical example, they suggest a framework for courts
to use to identify a high-crime area, based on "objective and verifiable
evidence." 88 The judgment of whether or not the location is a high-crime area
should follow from real data based on the actual experience of police officers
on the ground.
Max Minzner makes a similar argument in contrasting the assertions that
police officers make in support of probable cause in applications for search
warrants-which, he finds, are correct in about 80% of the cases-with those
made in quick, on-the-streetjudgments, which are no more than 12% accurate.8 9
In the latter category, which includes Terry stops and frisks, the judicial
assessment of probable cause or reasonable suspicion should include evidence
regarding the officers' "differential success rates"-in other words, proof of
their hit rates or rates of success over the great run of stops and frisks. "These
success rates," Minzner says, "capture information not currently analyzed in the
search process and their addition would improve the accuracy of probable-cause
decisions."9 0
Professor Jeffrey Fagan argues that the low standard of reasonable suspicion
for Terry stops and frisks-what Fagan calls Terry's "original sin"--has
allowed police to take action against members of the public that the probable
85 Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice?, supra note 83, at 374-75, 382.
86 1d at 382. This study is referenced in more detail, infra notes 261-72 and
accompanying text.87 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The "High-Crime Area" Question:
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable
Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 1587, 1629 (2008).
88d
89 Minzner, supra note 50, at 914, 921.
90 1d at 913. Professsor Anna Lvovsky addresses this issue from a different angle:
examining the ways in which courts have accepted "police expertise" in a range ofjudgments
relating to the detection and investigation of criminal conduct. She notes that the Court
frequently assumes that police possess "rare and reliable 'expert' insight," without
supporting empirical evidence. Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police
Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REv. 1995, 2081 (2017). Similar criticism has been made of police
forensic science, much of which has been shown to be unreliable by DNA testing. See, e.g.,
Adam B. Shniderman, Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science Refom: More
Sharks in Dirty Water, YALE L.J.F. 348, 348 (2017).
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cause standard would have disallowed, all without evidence of any
effectiveness. 9 1 Using large datasets from the Floyd litigation in New York City,
Fagan shows that the lower standard of reasonable suspicion makes policing
less, not more, effective at controlling crime.92 Stated differently, the data prove
that stops police made using the probable cause standard actually result in
reductions in crime; by contrast, stop activity utilizing the more subjective and
vague Terry reasonable suspicion standard may have very little effect on
crime.93
IV. DATA, EMPIRICISM AND POLICE STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES
These analytical articles and related research are dependent on the
availability of comprehensive and reliable data. Indeed, as data collection and
analysis has grown, so has empiricism, a process greatly enabled by big (and
little) data. We turn therefore to an overview of empirical evidence in
administrative and judicial decision-making.
A. The Role of Empiricism and Data in the Courts
The United States Supreme Court has given inconsistent signals regarding
the role of statistics, economic analysis, and empirical evidence in judicial
adjudications. In some areas, the Court has emphasized the need for empiricism.
For example in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,94 the Court rejected
the long-standing Frye test of "general acceptance" with respect to the
introduction of expert testimony.95 Interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
which imposes a standard for the use of expert testimony based on scientific or
91 Fagan, supra note 56, at 45.
92 See id at 84-95; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 575(S.D.N.Y. 2013).9 3 The recent data regarding stops and frisks and violent crime rates in New York City
support this thesis. In 2016, police reported approximately 12,500 pedestrian stops(representing a huge and precipitous drop from the peak of stop-and-frisk policing of close
to 700,000 stops in 2011), yet the violent crime rate continued to fall. Stop-and-Frisk Data,
N.Y.C.L. UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-data [https//permacc6Z4T-SR8Z];
see also Latest Data: Stop-and-Frisk and Crime Both Lowest in Years, N.Y.C.L. UNION (Oct.
11, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/latest-data-stop-and-frisk-and-crime-both-lowest-years
[https-//perma.cc/AKJ7-M55P] [hereinafter N.Y.C.L. UNION] (finding there were 7,636 stops
for the first six months). However, the court-appointed monitor in Floyd v. City ofNew York,
Peter Zimroth, has found a pattern of undocumented stops by police officers. Al Baker, City
Police Officers Are Not Reporting All Street Stops, Monitor Says, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 13,
2017), httpsJ//www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/nyregion/nypd-stop-and-fisk-monitor.html [https*//
perma.cc/25B4-YNGD].9 4 Daubert ex rel. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).9 5 1d at 597 (rejecting test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923)).
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technical expertise, the Court opted for a test with increased scientific rigor.96
Rule 702 requires that "all scientific testimony or evidence" must be "not only
relevant but reliable." 97 Reliability is based on sound scientific processes, and
"scientific knowledge" refers to "known facts or to any body of ideas inferred
from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds." 98 "[I]n order to qualify
as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the
scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known."99 The Daubert
standard has produced uneven results, but at its core, it supports the use of
empirical evidence and analysis in situations presenting the relevance of testable
factual propositions.100
Yet, just a few years before Daubert, the Court had rejected what seemed to
be decisive statistical proof of racial bias in capital sentencing practices. In
McCleskey v. Kemp,10 a challenge to the Georgia death penalty system rested
upon statistical studies by Dr. David Baldus that examined 2,000 Georgia
murder cases from the 1970s in an attempt to discern patterns in the jury
decisions on the death penalty. 102 Professor Baldus showed that "defendants
charged with killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the
cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in
only 1% of the cases." 103 The numbers also indicated a "reverse racial disparity
according to the race of the defendant: 4% of the black defendants received the
96 Id. at 589 ("That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean,
however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly
scientific evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." (footnote
omitted)).
9 7 d
9 8 Id. at 590 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRDNEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)).
9 Id
10 0Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 ("[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."); see also
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (describing Rule 702, as construed
in Daubert, as requiring the trial court to take on a "basic gatekeeping obligation" to ensure
that scientific and technical testimony are not only relevant but reliable and based on good
grounds). A number of commentators have pointed to the lack of Daubert standards in
criminal litigation where untested police "science" is not infrequently admitted. See, e.g., D.
Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards ofCertainty Being
Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 99-100, 149 (2000) (noting in the aftermath of
Daubert, federal judges seemed inclined to take a much more active role in keeping
questionable science out of the courtroom in civil cases, in which that scientific work came
to court as proposed evidence from plaintiffs seeking to prove damages, but much less
inclined to do so when questionable science originated with the prosecution in criminal
cases).
101 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
102Id at 286-87.
103Id at 286.
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death penalty, as opposed to 7% of the white defendants."l 04 The results of
Baldus's more sophisticated analysis, controlling for thirty-nine nonracial
variables, were even more damning. "[D]efendants charged with killing white
victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants
charged with killing blacks. According to this model, black defendants were 1.1
times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants." 0 5 Thus, the
Court said, "the Baldus study indicates that black defendants, such as
McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the
death penalty."l06
Even with this dramatic statistical evidence of racial disparity in a high-
stakes process, the Court found the empirical evidence beside the point as it did
not show that "the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory
purpose." 0 7 The Court allowed that it had considered statistical proof in other
areas of the law, for example, statistical disparities as proof of an equal
protection violation in the selection of the jury venire in a particular district, and
"multiple-regression analysis to prove statutory violations under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964."108 There seems little doubt but that the Court believed
that the statistical evidence of disparity as evidence of discrimination, even if
the strength and rigor of that evidence seemed unassailable, would prove too
powerful in ways that the Court did not welcome. Not only would such a rulingjeopardize the institution of capital punishment, but given the evidence of race
discrimination throughout the entire criminal justice system, the impact could
be even broader, a concern that Justice Brennan rightly captured in his
dissenting opinion as a fear of "too much justice." 09
The Court turned to empiricism again in Whole Woman 's Health v.
Hellerstedt,"1 0 a case that examined a Texas law that imposed new requirements
on medical facilities in which women could obtain abortions." The Court
reviewed the statute under the Planned Parenthood v. Casey "undue burden"
test. 112 The Texas law required that any doctor performing abortions have
"admitting privileges" at a hospital not more than thirty miles from the location
of the abortion clinic and required that the abortion facility meet the minimum
standards set for "ambulatory surgical centers."113 The plaintiffs challenged
these requirements as undue burdens on the constitutional right to obtain
104 Id.
10 5 Id at 287.
106_1d
107 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292.
108 Id at 294.
109Id at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
111"d at 2300.1 12 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion).
The plurality opinion stated that a law creates an undue burden on a woman's right to have
a legal abortion, making the law unconstitutional, if the "purpose or effect" of the law is to
"place a substantial obstacle in the pathof a woman" seeking a previability abortion. Id113 Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
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abortions, alleging that physicians could not obtain the required admitting
privileges, and that because the cost of retrofitting existing clinics to comply
with the ambulatory surgical center standards would prove so great that many
clinics would close, leaving huge areas of Texas without any abortion providers
or putting them so far away that the right to an abortion would exist in name
only.114
In the view of the majority, in the absence of relevant legislative findings,
the factual record showed no medical need for the law. Peer-reviewed studies
and expert testimony showed "no significant health related problem [for the
admitting privileges requirement] to cure" and the state's evidence failed to
show that the new law advanced any interest in women's health beyond what
the prior law already provided.' 15 "At the same time," the Court said, the
evidence showed that the admitting privileges requirement created a "substantial
obstacle" in the path of a woman wanting a legal abortion, in the form of a
"dramatic" drop in the number of clinics, fewer available doctors to perform the
procedures, and thus longer wait times. 116 Similarly, the ambulatory-surgical-
center standards imposed requirements that provided "no benefit when
complications arise," and that statistically, "abortions taking place in abortion
facilities are ... safer than numerous procedures that take place outside
hospitals and to which Texas does not apply its surgical-center
requirements."ll 7 The empirical facts in the record, the Court said, supported
the trial court's "ultimate legal conclusion that the ... requirement is not
necessary." 118
The use of data analysis has also come to the fore in cases challenging voter
identification statutes. These statutes are premised on voter fraud by persons
voting in the place of others. A robust debate and many investigations have
found no evidence for these claims, but legislators persist in these
enactments. 119 The legal challenges to these laws are based on allegations that
they disenfranchise poor and minority voters, because they are typically less
likely to have acceptable forms of identification. To prove these claims, the
challengers have presented experts from various disciplines who have used
statistical tools to examine, compare, and analyze the effect of voter
identification laws on voting populations, in order to measure just how many
voters, from what demographic groups, the laws would disenfranchise.
114Id. at 2310-18.
115 Id. at 2311.
l61d at 2312-18.
117Id. at 2315.
1l81d. at 2316.
119 See Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT'L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 5, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/eletions-and-campaigns/
voter-id.aspx [https://perma.cc/DA7D-6N6P].
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For example, Pennsylvania required particular kinds of state-issued
identification bearing a photograph of the person attempting to vote. 12 0 In
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Court looked closely at the
statistical, data-based evidence on the issue of how many people the law would
disenfranchise.121 The court credited statistical analysis that showed that
511,415 registered voters in the state lacked a form of identification acceptable
for voting. 122 On the related question of voter awareness of the voter
identification requirement, plaintiffs presented data on the results of inquiries
based on telephone interviews that showed minority voter disenfranchisement
would result from the law. 123
In Veasey v. Perry,124 a challenge to the Texas voter identification law was
based on claims that the law constituted a substantial burden on the right to vote,
discriminated against minority voters, and constituted a poll tax.125 Empirical
evidence was presented by "an expert in quantitative and qualitative historical
analysis of voting, political, and statistical data," whose report showed
"intentional discrimination against minorities to achieve a partisan political
advantage." 2 6 For example, the "provision allowing the use of concealed
handgun permits favor[edj Anglos because they are disproportionately
represented among those permit holders," and that was true as well for military
veterans' identification because "Anglos are a disproportionate share of Texas's
military veterans of voting-age population relative to African-Americans." 2 7
The evidence also showed that "[w]hen the legislature rejected student IDs, state
government employee IDs, and federal IDs, they rejected [forms of
identification] that are disproportionately held by African Americans and
Hispanics."1 28 In addition, two different experts used database matching (as in
the Applewhite case in Pennsylvania) and other statistical methods "to
determin[e] the number of registered voters who might lack [acceptable forms
of identification], along with their demographic characteristics."l 29 Based on
their work, the court found that "approximately 608,470 registered voters in
Texas, representing approximately 4.5% of all registered voters, lack qualified
[acceptable forms of identification], and of these, 534,512 voters do not qualify
for [an] exemption. Moreover, a disproportionate number of African-Americans
and Hispanics populate that group of potentially disenfranchised voters."1 30 The
1 2 0 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2014 WL 2619590, at *1 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Apr. 28, 2014).
1 2 1 Id at *6-7.
122Id at *6.
123_1d at *9.
124 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014), affd in part, vacated in part,
and judgment rendered in part, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).12 5 Id at 633.
1261d at 658.
127 _[d
128 [d
129Id at 659.
130 Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 659.
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statistical evidence formed the foundation for the court's finding that the law
disenfranchised and discriminated against minority voters. 131
Yet, for each area in which the courts have looked to statistical and other
empirical evidence to inform their fact-finding process, in others there continues
to be reliance on intuition and common sense, even where science and social
science provides more advanced metrics. For example, in Manson v.
Braithwaite,132 the Court ruled that in determining reliability of identifications,
a court should consider the opportunity of the witness to view the perpetrator,
his degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness's prior description, level of
the witness's certainty, and the time between the crime and confrontation. 133
This due process analysis has remained unchanged for over forty years,
notwithstanding a multitude of studies that demonstrate that the factors that the
Court has credited in assessing reliability where suggestive practices may have
been used are not valid. 134 And, there are continuing debates about empirical
data and normative constitutional principles in other areas. 135
131 Statistical analysis also played a significant role in the ruling of a three-judge district
court in North Carolina finding unconstitutional the 2016 North Carolina redistricting plan
on grounds that the plan discriminated against voters who support Democratic Party
candidates. Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 608, 629 (M.D.N.C. 2017), stay
granted, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (mem.). In Common Cause, the plaintiffs presented a range
of expert testimony showing that the plan is an "extreme statistical outlier" in its disfavoring
of non-Republican candidates, and that there is a large "partisan symmetry" resulting in a
translation of votes into a Republican Party advantage. Id
13 2 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
13 3 Id. at 114.
134 See, e.g., Dennis v. Sec'y, Pa. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 314 (3d Cir. 2016) (en
banc) (McKee, C.J., concurring); Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 414-16 (Alaska 2016); State
v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 928, modified, State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 938 (N.J. 2011); State
v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 695 (Or. 2012); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT 1-4 (Oct. 1999); Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan,
Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test
in Light ofEyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2008) (criticizing
continued use of criteria for assessing reliability of identifications that have been shown to
be faulty by social science studies). The Supreme Court had the opportunity to revise these
criteria in Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 232-33 (2012), but avoided the issue in
ruling that that there was no "state action" in the particular identification procedure used in
that case. Id. at 233.
135 See, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Supreme Court's Confused Empirical
Jurisprudence, Article in Expert Evidence Report, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 14, 2015),
https-/ucconsortiumssl.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/faigman-bna-glossip-g2i.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4QUB-AGG3] (criticizing decision in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), for
applying the "clearly erroneous" standard review in a lethal injection case). In cases
presenting the issue of whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient
to trigger Fourth Amendment review, the doctrinal question of whether the expectation is
objectively reasonable has been made in many instances without regard as to how a majority
of persons assess their privacy interests in various locations and contexts. Public surveys and
polls show a large disconnect between what many persons view as private areas and conduct
and what the Supreme Court has recognized as an objectively reasonable expectation of
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B. Risk Assessment Tools
Risk assessment tools are data-based instruments that allow judgments and
decisions to be made on an empirical measure of the actual, as opposed to an
assumed or intuited risk. These tools could assist judges and others to assess the
risks inherent in a criminal justice decision, based on data reflected in thousands
of individual cases with respect to bail, sentencing, and parole. For example,
under most governing statutes and rules, the bail/pretrial release decision centers
upon the question of whether the arrestee, if released, will appear at later court
proceedings. In practice, however, courts regularly place significant weight on
their assessment of whether the suspect, if released, would pose a danger to the
community. Where a court has serious concerns about the dangerousness of the
suspect, bail will be set at an amount the defendant is unlikely to make.
In some jurisdictions, courts do not do any risk balancing; instead, there is
a bail "schedule" laying out the preset amounts of bail, based solely on the
current charge and criminal history information. Many have noted the irrational
aspects of these approaches.136 A judge considering a defendant for possible
release will almost always have some concerns about the possibility that the
suspect will offend while on release, perhaps violently. But whenjudges set bail,
a suspect who has sufficient resources can secure release by posting money or
property even if she represents a true risk to the public. By contrast, an indigent
suspect in a low-level, non-dangerous offense, no matter how sure to show up
in court, will remain in custody if a money bond is set.
Might there be empirically based alternatives? Several years ago, the Laura
and John Arnold Foundation designed a tool to givejudges the benefit of "data-
driven, objective risk assessment[s]" of the risks individuals posed.1 37 The goal
was to enable the courts to release those defendants who did not pose a risk of
committing crimes, especially violent crimes, or who were not serious flight
risks. 138 Some jurisdictions used risk assessment tools, and though they were
imperfect, there was some evidence that these jurisdictions had "been able to
spend less on pretrial incarceration, while at the same time enhancing public
safety." 139 The Foundation's researchers created a tool that included nine
factors, all available from the suspects' record, as the most pertinent risk
privacy. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
"Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 772-74 (1993);
cf Williams v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 567-69 (3d Cir. 2017) (discussing
empirical studies showing the impact of long-term solitary confinement on physical and
mental health of inmates), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 357 (2017) (mem.).
136 See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Bail Was $500, Money He Didn't Have. Atlanta Faces
Calls for Change., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/us/atlanta
-bail-courts-reform.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
13 7 LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL
RISK ASSESSMENT 5 (Nov. 2013).
1 3 81d at 1.
1 3 9 1d at 2.
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predictors for "new crime, new violence, and failure to appear [for court] ."140
Their studies suggested that defendants failed at similar rates in each of the three
risk categories, regardless of race or gender, which would support the assertion
"that the assessment [tool] does not over-classify non-whites' risk levels, which
has been a concern in some other areas of risk assessment." 4 1
When testing began, preliminary results showed that the Arnold Foundation
tool-called PSA-Court-"successfully predict[s] criminal reoffending and
failing to return to court."1 42 By July 2015, PSA-Court had been rolled out
nationally, in courts across the United States "in 29 jurisdictions, including three
entire states-Arizona, Kentucky, and New Jersey-as well as three of the
largest cities in the country-Charlotte, Chicago, and Phoenix."
1 43 As these
jurisdictions implemented their use of the tool, results seemed promising. In
Kentucky, both jail populations and pretrial crime rates fell; in Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina (the location of the city of Charlotte), the jail population
fell by almost 20%.144 However, these reported trends, as well as the causative
relationship between the risk assessment tools and releases of pretrial
defendants, have been called into question in more recent studies.1 45
But with the increasing use of data-based risk assessment across the
criminal justice system, criticism has arisen. One such system, created by a
private company, Northpointe, is used to predict the likelihood of re-offending
for purposes of sentencing decisions.1 46 An investigation by ProPublica of seven
thousand cases in Broward County, Florida, for 2013 and 2014 provided a
disquieting picture.1 47 ProPublica found that "[o]nly 20[%] of the people
140Id at 3-4.
1 4 1 1d at 5.
1421Id
143 Press Release, Laura & John Arnold Found., More than 20 Cities and States Adopt
Risk Assessment Tool To Help Judges Decide Which Defendants To Detain Prior to Trial
(June 26, 2015), http://www.amoldfoundation.org/more-than-20-cities-and-states-adopt-risk-
assessment-to[ol-to-help-judges-decide-which-defendants-to-detain-prior-to-ial/ [https//permacc/
NDB4-BLXJ].
144 jd
14 5 See John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and
the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 24-39, 49-
51), https://ssm.com/abst3ct041622 [https://perma.ccl384S-WUC8] (explaining that the data
jurisdictions are using for risk assessment are outdated and will limit the potential positive
impact of reform); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MIN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 28-50), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3016088
[https://perma.cc/5D4N-YVY5] (using data from Kentucky, after the state's adoption of
pretrial risk assessment, to show that it had little impact on pretrial release and cost
effectiveness).
146 Northpointe, Practicioners Guide to COMPAS 14, EQIIVANT (Aug. 17, 2012),
http-//www.northpointeinc.com/files/technicaldocuments/FieldGuide2_081412.pdf https://perma
.cc/M2V4-NK3W].
14 7 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https//www.propubli
ca.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [httpsJ/permacc/4JS5-ZBFF].
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predicted to commit violent crimes actually went on to do so."1 48 With respect
to re-offending at any level, including lower level, misdemeanor crimes, the tool
worked somewhat better: "Of those deemed likely to re-offend, 61[%] were
arrested for any subsequent crimes within two years."1 49 More disturbing,
ProPublica's examination appears to have uncovered racial bias in the process.
"The [Northpointe] formula was particularly likely to falsely flag black
defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice
the rate as white defendants. White defendants were mislabeled as low risk more
often than black defendants." 50 Northpointe, which did not disclose its entire
process and formula for arriving at the risk assessment scores-the company
says that information is proprietary-denied ProPublica's findings, disagreeing
with the methodology used and the accuracy of ProPublica's testing.15 1 Others
have suggested that the bias findings may have more to do with biases in the
underlying criminal justice system and data, and not with Northpointe's tool.1 52
The lessons seem clear. Risk assessment tools may well provide more
reliable and predictive information than current methodologies, but they present
their own problems. Validation by uninterested sources should be a universal
requirement, and as Professor Christopher Slobogin has stated, "[r]isk
assessments should be impermissible unless both parties get to see all the data
that go into them.. . . It should be an open, full-court adversarial
proceeding."l 53
148 Id.
149 Id
ISolId; see also Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https-//www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-
recidivism-algorithm [https://perma.cc/622Y-45WG]. There has also been scholarly analysis
and criticism. See, e.g., John Monahan, Risk Assessment in Sentencing, in 4 REFORMING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77, 77-78 (Erik Luna ed., 2017); Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and
Perils ofEvidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 537 (2015); Starr, supra note
73, at 805-08, 838.
151 Angwin et al., supra note 147 ("In a letter, [Northpointe] criticized ProPublica's
methodology and defended the accuracy of its test .... ).
152 Anthony W. Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A
Rejoinder to "Machine Bias: There's Software Used Across the Country To Predict Future
Criminals. AndIt's BiasedAgainst Blacks, " 80 FED. PROB. 38,38 (2016); Max Ehrenfreund,
The Machines that Could Rid Courtrooms of Racism, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/18/why-a-computer-program-that-
judges-rely-on-around-the-country-was-accused-of-racism/ [https://perma.cc/9W1U8-33CX]
(explaining that ProPublica's statistics "are misleading" because they "could reflect broader
racial disparities" both in the criminal justice system and society at large).
1 53 Angwin et al., supra note 147; see also Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575
(Ind. 2010) (upholding the use of a risk assessment tool in the sentencing context); State v.
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761-64 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.)
(examining the use of risk assessment at sentencing); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous
Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 566-67 (2018); Monahan, supra note 150, at 93-94; Wexler,
supra note 73. Predictive analytics are being employed in a wide range of disciplines and
industries, and these analytics continue to show the inherent weaknesses in common sense
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C. Data, Empiricism, and Stops and Frisks
Even with considerable data regarding stop-and-frisk practices potentially
available to police departments and ultimately to the courts, only a few
departments actually collect and maintain this data in a comprehensive and
usable form. Nothing in Terry, in any other Supreme Court decisions, or in any
federal law required or incentivized the collection of this data. The few police
departments that have collected data-most prominently, New York City and
Philadelphia-have done so as a result of litigation.1 54
But there are signs of change. In a 2014 article, David Harris published the
results of a survey of fifty-five of the largest police departments in the
country. 55 The survey, conducted in 2011 and 2012, garnered forty-four
responses, and out of those, twenty-three reported requiring police officers to
collect at least some data on stops and frisks.1 56 Three others made data
collection discretionary; eighteen had no requirement. 157 Of the twenty-three
departments requiring some data collection, twenty-one reported that the data
included racial and ethnic characteristics of those stopped; thirteen reported that
the data were available to the public in some form. 158 The departments included
some of the largest law enforcement agencies in the country, thus encompassing
a significant number of police officers.1 59
No doubt some aspects of this change-while too little and too slow, but a
noticeable shift nonetheless-are motivated by supervisors' desire to effectively
oversee day-to-day precinct-level operations. The old saw from the business
world, "you can't manage what you don't measure," applies as well to police
judgments not tested by reliable data. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, Will You Graduate? Ask
Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/education/edlife/
will-you-graduate-ask-big-data.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (finding early
course performance as the best predictor of graduation rates).
1 54 See, e.g., Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree at 3-7,
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011) [hereinafter
Philadelphia Consent Decree]; infra notes 171-85 and accompanying text. Missouri is the
only state that statutorily requires collection of stop data, but even there it is limited to traffic
stops. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 590.650 (West 2011). The ABA and NAACP Legal Defense Fund
have remarked: "We cannot understand what we cannot measure, and we cannot change
what we cannot understand." Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n & LDF, American Bar
Association and NAACP Legal Defense Fund Joint Statement on Eliminating Bias in the
Criminal Justice System (July 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/about-us/ABA-LDF/ 2OJoi
ni%20Statement%20o20Eliinating%20Bias%20in%20the%20Criminal%20Jusice%20Syst
em.pdf [https-/perma.cc/QYY2-7KLQ]; see also Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack
Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REv. 1119, 1123-24 (2013) (detailing the complexities of
local politics and their impact on police department data transparency).
155 Harris, supra note 57, at 856.
156 Id. at 870-71.
157ld at 871.
15 81d
1591d
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management. 160 In other departments, pressure to collect data about stop-and-
frisk practices has come from the public. Stops and frisks have long constituted
a frequent point of friction and contention between police officers and members
of the public, particularly with members of African American and other
minority communities, a fact noted in the Terry opinion.161
The stop-and-frisk crime suppression strategy of the New York City police
department became a major political and legal issue and ultimately played a
significant role in the 2013 New York mayoral election.1 62 Thereafter, the
combination of a change of mayoral administrations and the limits imposed by
the Floyd court has led to a precipitous reduction in the number of stops and
frisks.1 63 Similarly, in Chicago, in March 2015, months before the city erupted
after the release of the video of the police shooting of Laquan McDonald,' 64 the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Illinois had turned a spotlight on
the Police Department's unlawful use of stops and frisks, especially against
African Americans and other people of color.1 6 5 The Illinois ACLU and others
demanded considerably improved data collection for all stops and frisks. 166 In
Boston, complaints that stops and frisks targeted African Americans led to
changes in the collection of data in that city. A paper-based system, that a high-
ranking police department spokesperson conceded had "a lot of potential for
data errors," was changed into an electronic system.16 7 According to Boston
City Council President Michelle Wu, who made more transparency in city
government one of her top issues, "the goal is to say [to the public,] here is the
160 Daniel Denvir, The Key Ingredient in Stop-and-Frisk Reform: Open Data, CITYLAB
(Aug. 24,2015), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/08/the-missing-ingredient-in-stop-and-frisk-
accountability-open-data/402026/ [https//permacc/NGN4-QVGJ].
161 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968).162 Annie Karni, How Bill de Blasio's Nimble 2013 Mayoral Election Campaign Got
Democratic Party Back into Gracie Mansion, N.Y. DAILY NEwS (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/election/bill-de-blasio-nimble-campaign-made-mayor-article-
1.1507754 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) ("[De Blasio] campaigned relentlessly
against ... stop-and-frisk tactics that have resulted in police stopping hundreds of thousands
of innocent minorities.").
1 63 N.Y.C.L. UNION, supra note 93, at 2; Fifth Report of the Independent Monitor:
Analysis of NYPD Stops Reported, 2013-2015, Floyd v. New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 1034).
164 See Christy Gutowski, 2 Years Later, Laquan McDonald Shooting Leaves a Trail of
Change, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquanmedonald/ct-
laquan-mcdonald-shooting-anniversary-met-20161020-storyhtml [https://perma.cc/3SQC-VAE5].
1 6 5 ACLU OF ILLINOIS, STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 2-3 (Mar. 2015).
166Id ("Currently, officers are not required to record when they frisk
someone.... Absent a record, supervisors and the public have no means to determine
whether officers' searches are lawful. Officers should record frisks, the reason for the frisk(which must be separate from the reason for the stop), and the results of the search (i.e.,
whether there was a weapon or other contraband and if so, what type.")).
167 Jordan Graham, Boston Police To Update Traffic Stop Database, Gov'T TECH. (Jan.
20,2016), http://www.govtech.com/public-afety/Boston-Police-to-Update-Trafic-Stop-Database
.html [https://perma.cef26PE-WLM2].
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information we're collecting, can you help us out, look for trends we haven't
seen."1 68
In Newark, New Jersey, then-Mayor (currently Senator) Cory Booker came
to an agreement with citizens and advocacy groups to make all police reports of
stops and frisks available to the public.1 69 The city pledged to make stop-and-
frisk reports, "detailing the race, gender, age, force[] used, and arrests made,"
available monthly. 170 The idea was to improve police-community relations by
building trust with the community, since it would have all the information
necessary to see what the police did and whether any abuses had taken place,
and simultaneously to help police to focus less on the wrong targets by
indicating those searches yielding fewer arrests and seizures of contraband than
others.
The extensive data collection efforts in New York and Philadelphia came
about as a result of settlements of lawsuits brought by private parties represented
by nongovernmental organizations. In New York, the police department had
kept internal records of stops and frisks for years, requiring officers to record
the details of the encounters on a form known as UF-250.1 7 1 In a 1999 class
action lawsuit, Daniels v. City ofNew York,172 filed by plaintiffs represented by
the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a court required that the New York
Police Department (NYPD) provide all UF-250s completed by officers to CCR,
thus creating a database of stop-and-frisk data from the largest police
department in the country, which was making increasingly intense use of stops
and frisks.173 In Philadelphia, the ACLU of Pennsylvania's 2010 lawsuit, Bailey
v. City of Philadelphia,174 resulted in a consent decree that required the
collection and electronic maintenance of data on all stops and frisks to be shared
with an independent monitor and the ACLU lawyers for use in monitoring the
stop-and-frisk program under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards.1
75
The federal government has also imposed data-collection requirements on
police departments. Pursuant to authority granted by Congress in a 1994 statute
known as the "pattern or practice" law, the DOJ may now investigate and, if
necessary, bring suit in federal court upon findings that a state or local police
department has engaged in a pattern of conduct or consistently engages in
practices that deprive people of their constitutional rights.1 76 The Civil Rights
168 Id
169 Gregory Ferenstein, Cory Booker Opens Stop-and-Frisk Data to the Public. Here's
Why It Might Help., TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 27, 2013), https://techcnmch.com/2013/08/27/corybo
oker-opens-stop-and-frisk-data-to-the-public-heres-why-it-might-help/ [https://perma.cc/RQ3T-
A4CE].
170 Id
171 Daniels v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
1721d at 565.
173Id at 563-65.
174 Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 4, 2010).
175 Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree at 3-7, Bailey, No.
10-5952.
176 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012).
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Division of the DOJ has investigated a number of U.S. police departments,
starting with Pittsburgh in 1997.177 In the usual course of events, the Special
Litigation Section conducts an in-depth investigation which often includes
search and seizure practices, use of force, training, and policies and practices
concerning the use of police custody, restraints, and particular weapons.1 78 If,
upon completion of the investigation, the Special Litigation Section finds that
the agency has engaged in a pattern or practice of violating constitutional rights,
it proposes reforms to the agency; these reforms often become the basis for a
court-supervised consent decree.1 79 A number of these consent decrees have
required that police departments collect stop-and-frisk data, including those in
effect in Los Angeles180 and New Orleans.181
Recently, the DOJ reached a settlement agreement with the City of
Cleveland over various aspect of police conduct, including use of force and
search and seizure practices.1 82 The agreement mandates the collection and
analysis of data on a variety of police conduct that the DOJ investigated, and
specifically requires the collection of specified data on all stops and searches by
police, including stops and frisks of pedestrians.1 83 And, in the closing days of
the Obama Administration, the DOJ entered into agreements with the Baltimore
Police Department (BPD) that required the BPD to collect and maintain data on
all stops, searches, and arrests to ensure that officers' enforcement activities
promote public safety and are consistent with constitutional and legal
standards.1 84 The DOJ attempted to reach a similar agreement with the City of
Chicago.18 5
177 Consent Decree at 1-2, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 26, 1997).
1 7 8 The best description of this process can be found in the Civil Rights Division's
January 2017 report. CIVIL RIGHTS DIv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
DIVISIoN'S PATTERN AND PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 9 (Jan. 2017).
179Id. at 20-21.
180 Consent Decree at 42-46, United States v. Los Angeles, No. 00-cv-11769 (C.D. Cal.
June 15, 2001).
18 1 Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department at 42-43, United
States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2013).
182 Settlement Agreement at 39-43, United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-
01046 (N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015).
183Id. at 60-61, 100.
184 Consent Decree, United States v. Police Dep't, No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB (D. Md. Jan.
12, 2017). The district court approved the Consent Decree and denied the motion of the DOJ
for additional time for the Trump Administration to review this agreement. See United States
v. Bait. Police Dep't, No. JKB-17-99, at 4, 7 (D. Md. Apr. I 7,2017) (order approving consent
decree and denying governments motion to delay entry).1 8 5 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE CITY OF CHICAGO REGARDING THE CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925901/download [https://penna.cc/8XW
Z-Z3LU]; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT 158-61 (Jan. 2017). In light of the failure of the city and the DOJ to follow
through with adopting a Consent Decree, a lawsuit by persons alleged to have been harmed
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Of course, there is never a pure linear progression or assurance of continued
best practices. And as the Trump Administration took control of the DOJ in
2017, there is good reason to believe that much of the work of the Civil Rights
Division with regard to local law enforcement agencies will be reduced or
terminated. 186
D. Litigation and Studies
Over the past twenty years, a number of cases and studies have employed
statistical analysis to assess the legality, racial distribution, and efficacy of stop-
and-frisk practices, with significant debate about the proper "benchmarks" and
standards to be applied on all of these issues. In this Part, we summarize a
number of the leading studies and court cases and then turn our attention to the
largely overlooked significance of hit-rate data in the assessment of the
predictive value of many of the generally accepted grounds for stop-and-frisk
interventions.
1. New Jersey Turnpike and Racial Profiling
In one of the first cases presenting the issue of racial disparities in police
stop practices, State v. Soto, the court found that car stops and searches on the
New Jersey Turnpike disproportionately targeted African Americans.18 7
Relying on traffic and violator surveys and a large set of data regarding traffic
stops on the Turnpike, the court determined that approximately 14% of all cars
on the Turnpike had at least one black occupant, that virtually all drivers violated
the traffic laws (in particular for speeding), and that blacks and whites violated
traffic laws at almost exactly the same rate.188 Yet 46.2% of stops were of black
motorists, representing a statistically significant disparity of 16.35 standard
deviations.1 89 Further, the court found that while radar stops made by the radar
unit were relatively consistent with the percentage of black violators,
by past practices and policies has been filed. Civil Complaint at 1-2, Campbell v. City of
Chicago, No. 17-cv-02984 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2017).186 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring
Troubled Police Agencies, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 28, 2017), https/www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/
us/politic&jeff-sessions-crime.htnl [https//perma.cc/3ZW6-VPV6]; Jon Swaine, Jeff Sessions
Could Weaken Police Reforms on Excessive Force and Racial Bias, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017jan/10jeff-sessions-police-reform-excessive-
force-racial-bias-justice-department [https-//penrnacc/TEV7-2Z4H] (reporting Sessions would
not rule out changes to existing consent decrees and stated that consent decrees and other
DOJ actions had "unfairly maligned" police.).
187 State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (noting that the
statistical disparities between African-American and white motorists stopped for traffic
offenses were "stark").
188 Id. at 352-53.
1 89 1d. at 353.
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discretionary stops made by the patrol division-a unit involved in drug
interdiction-resulted in double the percentage of blacks stopped.1 90
A study conducted by Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey,
expanded upon these findings. 191 Verniero determined that searches of cars on
the Turnpike were even more racially disparate than the initial stops: 77.2% of
all "consent" searches were of Hispanics and blacks. 192 Verniero concluded that
the use of arrest statistics could not justify racially disparate stops and searches,
as those arrests were the product of racially discriminatory law enforcement
practices.1 93
2. New York City Stop-and-Frisk Practices
In 1999, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, conducted a study of
175,000 pedestrian stops by the NYPD over a fifteen-month period in 1998-
1999 and found a highly disproportionate rate of stops of minorities. 194 Spitzer
190Id at 354, 356.
191 PETER VERNIERO, ATTORNEY GEN. OF N.J., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE
REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 1-2 (Apr. 1999).192Id at 26-28. Seizures of contraband or arrests following these stops on the Turnpike
were made at a rate of 10.5% from white drivers and 13.5% from African-American drivers.
Id. at 28.
193 Id at 67-68. There is a broad range of studies and litigation on the issue of the racial
distribution of traffic stops. Eg., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ARIZ., DRIVING WHILE
BLACK OR BROWN: AN ANALYSIS OF RACIAL PROFILING IN ARIZONA 3 (Apr. 2008) (finding
that Native Americans were 3.25 times more likely, and African Americans and Hispanics
2.5 times more likely to be subjected to searches than whites after being stopped); AMY
FARRELL ET AL., NE. UNIV. INST. ON RACE & JUSTICE, RHODE ISLAND TRAFFIC STOP
STATISTICS ACT FINAL REPORT 1 (June 2003) ("In most communities in Rhode Island non-
white drivers are stopped disproportionately to their presence in the driving population.");
STEPHEN M. HAAS ET AL., DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., WEST VIRGINIA TRAFFIC STOP
STUDY: FINAL REPORT, at i, 7-9 (Feb. 2009) ("State-level results indicate that black drivers
are 1.64 times more likely ... [and] Hispanics were 1.48 times more likely to be stopped
compared to white drivers."); ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, THE UNIV. OF
ILL. AT CHI. CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN LAW & JUSTICE, ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS ACT
2010 ANNUAL REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 (July 2011) ("[V]ehicles driven by
African-Americans and Hispanics are twice as likely to be the subject of a consent search
tha[n] those driven by Caucasians."); see also Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89
F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md.
Dep't of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563-64 (D. Md. 1999). Dr. John Lamberth
employed regression analysis and found racial disparities in traffic stops in Kalamazoo,
Michigan. JOHN C. LAMBERTH, TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS PROJECT 29 (Sept. 2013).
Traffic stops present some different issues than pedestrian stops flowing primarily from the
fact that almost all drivers violate traffic laws at the same rate, thus permitting pretextual
stops. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996).
194 N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 88-89 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter REPORT],
httpsf//ag.ny.gov/sites/default/fdes/pdfsbureaus/civilrights/stp_frsk-pdf [https//permacd7CGK-
DPXU].
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determined that (1) African Americans were stopped six times more frequently
than whites; 19 5 (2) in precincts where African American constituted 10% or less
of the population, stops of African Americans constituted 30% of all stops, more
than ten times their percentage of the population;1 9 6 (3) stops of African
Americans were less likely to result in arrests than stops of whites;
197 and
(4) adjusting for crime rates by race, the differences in stops of minorities
compared to stops of whites was statistically significant, with African
Americans stopped more than twice as often as whites for suspected violent
crimes and weapons offenses. 198 Spitzer also reported that where the police
provided a full factual statement concerning the stop, 15.4% of the stops failed
to comply with Fourth Amendment standards.'9 In addition, 23.5% of the stops
failed to provide a sufficient factual basis to determine whether the stop was
constitutionally proper.20 0 However, these findings were largely overshadowed
by the racial analysis of the stops.
Floyd v. City of New York20 1 was a lawsuit built on the foundations of the
N.Y. Attorney General investigation of 1999 and on data on stops and frisks in
New York City for the period 2004-2012.202 During that time period, the NYPD
made 4.4 million pedestrian stops, of which over 80% were of African
Americans or Latinos. 203 More than half of those stopped were also subjected
to a frisk.2 04 Floyd presented a challenge to these stop-and-frisk practices on
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.205
Crediting a number of statistical methodologies, including regression
analysis, that had been presented by the plaintiffs' expert, Professor Jeffrey
Fagan, the court determined that the stop-and-frisk program in New York City
was marked by intentional race discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 206 Professor Fagan determined that the best predictor of stops was
the racial composition of the precinct; that blacks and Hispanics were more
likely to be stopped (even in areas with predominantly white populations); that
blacks and Hispanics were 30% more likely to be arrested (as opposed to
receiving a summons) after being stopped, and 14% more likely to be subjected
to the use of force during the stop; and that the bit rate for blacks and Hispanics
(as measured by recovery of contraband, arrests made, or summonses issued
1 95 Id. at 95.
196 Id at 106.
197 Id. at 93.
1981d at 126.
199See id at xiv.2 0 0 REPORT, supra note 194, at xiv.
201 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
2 02 Id at 560-61.
203Id at 556.
2 04 Id
205Id at 557.
206Id at 559-60, 572-75.
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following a stop and/or frisk) was 8% lower for blacks and Hispanics than for
whites. 207
On the Fourth Amendment issue, based on an analysis of the reasons
provided on the NYPD stop forms for stops and frisks, the court ruled that a
significant number of stops were made without the requisite reasonable
suspicion.208 Further, the court determined that certain factors frequently cited
by police for their interventions were poor indicators of crime.209 Thus, "Furtive
movements" and/or presence in "High Crime Areas" were each cited in over
40% of the stops, yet they rarely produced any evidence of criminal conduct.210
The court further found that "52% of all stops were followed by a protective
frisk for weapons," but that a weapon was found in only 1.5% of these frisks
and that "6% of all stops resulted in an arrest, and 6% resulted in a summons." 2 11
"The remaining 88% of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further law
enforcement action." 212
207 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558, 589. Beyond the statistical evidence, the court found
evidence of intentional discrimination through an examination of "institutional evidence,"
and specifically the deliberate indifference of the NYPD to patterns of racial discrimination
in stop-and-frisk practices. Id at 590. Patterns of race discrimination were known to the
NYPD as early as 1999 when the State Attorney General issued a report on stop-and-frisk
practices that documented unexplained racial disparities in stops. Id at 560, 590-91. Further,
the NYPD put great pressure on commanders and others in the chain of command (down to
patrol officers) to increase the number of stops (from 97,000 in 2002 to 686,000 in 2011),
but that the NYPD failed to audit the stops in a manner that would examine possible racial
discrimination. Id at 591-96. And there was evidence that officers were encouraged to make
stops based on racial characteristics or stereotypes and direct orders to the target the "right
people," which was explained as blacks and Hispanics since it was young men of color who
were committing violent crimes most often. Id at 603-04.
Similar findings regarding racial bias have been made with respect to other major
police departments. For Los Angeles, see IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF
RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 27 (Oct. 2008).
The authors stated that "[i]t is implausible that the higher frisk and search rates werejustified
by higher minority criminality .. . when these frisks and searches were less likely to
uncover ... contraband." Id; see also CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING Los ANGELES
UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 22-24 (May 2009).
For Boston, see ACLU OF MASS., BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON BOSTON
POLICE DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007-2010, at 1-2 (Oct. 2014). For
Chicago, see ACLU FOUND. OF ILL., STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 1-2 (May 2015), and see
also ARLANDER KEYS, THE CONSULTANT'S FIRST SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON THE
INVESTIGATORY STOP AND PREVENTATIVE PAT DowN AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD
JANUARY 1, 2016-JuNE 30, 2016, at 139-40 (Mar. 2017), and ARLANDER KEYS, THE
CONSULTANT'S SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT: INVESTIGATORY STOP & PROTECTIVE PAT
DowN AGREEMENT 9-14 (Mar. 2018).
208 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
209Id at 579-83.
210Id at 581-83.
211 Id at 573.
212 Id
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The low hit rates in New York City (and as we discuss, infra, in other
departments as well) present a host of issues regarding the reasonable suspicion
legal standard.2 13 In particular, the low rate of gun seizure raised serious
questions regarding the validity of the factors upon which police rely in frisking
for guns. In 2011, the NYPD made 524,873 more stops than in 2003, an increase
of over 300%, but recovered only 176 more guns, an incremental recovery rate
of 0.03%.214 And in 2012, the police conducted approximately 297,000 frisks
(56% of all stops) and weapons were found in only 2% of these cases.2 15 Blacks
and Latinos were more likely to be frisked than whites, even though whites were
much more likely to be found in possession of weapons. 2 16
Moreover, with the sharp drop in the number of stops in New York City
following Floyd and the election of Mayor DeBlasio, it is possible to conduct at
least a preliminary comparative analysis of the relationship between and among
stop-and-frisk practices, crime control, and constitutional policing.
Notwithstanding the dispute as to the size of the drop in stops due to questions
that police may not have been reporting some stops, 217 the reduction from the
nearly 700,000 stops in 2011,218 is dramatic.2 19 And, with far fewer stops, the
hit rates have increased and violent crime has continued to decline. 220
213 See Kinports, supra note 50, at 64; Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere
Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REv. 407, 414-17 (2006); Minzner, supra note 50, at 920-22;
Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way out? Should It Be?, 10 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 352-53 (2013).
2 14 N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2011, at 2,6-12 (May 2012); see also
United States v. McCrae, No. 07-CR-772(JG), 2008 WL 115383, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11,
2008) (fifty stops made on "telltale signs" of possession of guns as reported by officer
making stops, resulted in a single gun seizure). A study by the New York Attorney General
on the outcome of the cases in which arrests were made after a stop in New York City for
the years 2009-2012 (6% of the total stops) showed that close to a half did not result in a
conviction, fewer than one in four (or about 1.5% of all stops) "resulted in a jail or prison
sentence," one in fifty (or about 0.1% of all stops) resulted in a conviction of a crime of
violence or for possession of a weapon, and close to one-quarter of these arrests were
dismissed before arraignment or downgraded to an infraction or violation. N.Y. STATE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., A REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 1 (Nov. 2013). In cases with random
stops, the rate of seizures of guns and drugs has been appreciably higher. See, e.g, City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000) (noting that of 1,161 random road-block
stops, 4.7% led to arrests for drug-related offenses).
2 1 5 CHRISTOPHER DUNN, N.Y. CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2012, NYCLU
BRIEFING 8 (May 2013).
216Id at 10 ("[A] weapon was found in only 1.8% of blacks and Latinos frisked, as
compared to a weapon being found in 3.9% of whites frisked.").
2 17 See Seventh Report of the Independent Monitor at 38, Floyd v. City of New York,
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2017).
2 18 N.Y.C.L. UNION, supra note 93 (documenting 685,724 stops in 2011).
2 19 See Sixth Report of the Independent Monitor at 3 n.1, Floyd v. City of New York,
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2017).220 N.Y.C.L. UNION, supra note 93.
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3. Philadelphia Stop-and-Frisk Practices
In 2011, in a class action lawsuit filed against the City of Philadelphia,
alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations in stop-and-frisk
practices, 221 the parties agreed to a consent decree that required the City to
conduct stops and frisks within constitutional limits, prohibited stops and frisks
without reasonable suspicion (specifying certain conduct that did not establish
reasonable suspicion, such as "loitering," presence in "high crime areas," acting
"suspiciously," and making "furtive movements"), prohibited the use of race as
a basis for a stop except in cases of suspect identifications by race, mandated
the creation of an electronic database of all stops and frisks with relevant
information as to each stop, provided for the appointment of an independent
monitor, and established a monitoring and auditing process under which
plaintiffs' counsel and the monitor would have access to all relevant data and
information. 222
The long-standing problems of stops and frisks without reasonable
suspicion and large racial disparities in stop practices have proven to be slow to
remedy, even with court oversight. Thus, an analysis of stops and frisks in the
first half of 2015 showed that approximately 33% of all stops were made without
the requisite reasonable suspicion and 56% of all frisks were made without
reasonable suspicion or were the "fruit" of an illegal stop.223 Indeed, the data
suggests that the unreasonable frisk rate may even be higher, as only 13.6% of
stops resulted in a reported frisk and of "159 stops in which guns or gun-related
activity [were] referenced as a basis for the stop, there were no frisks recorded
on 55 stops, or 35% of the total."2 24 Following the implementation of new
internal accountability measures, some progress was seen in 2016. As
documented in Plaintiffs' Eighth Report to the Court, the percentage of stops
without reasonable suspicion was reduced to 21%, and frisks without reasonable
suspicion occurred in 41% of the incidents reviewed. 225
On the Fourteenth Amendment racial distribution issue, the 2015 data
showed patterns of racial bias. For each police service area (subunits of police
districts) there were an average of 1,251 stops of black pedestrians, 375 of white
pedestrians, and 136 of Latino pedestrians. 226 The stop rate by race per 10,000
residents was 1,611 for blacks, 747 for whites, and 583 for Latinos. 2 27 A
regression analysis that controlled for possible nonracial causative factors,
including demographic makeup and crimes rates by district, showed that
221 Philadelphia Consent Decree, supra note 154, at 1.
222 Id. at 3-5.
223 Plaintiffs' Sixth Report to Court, supra note 30, at 31.
224Id at 18.
225 Plaintiffs' Eighth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth
Amendment Issues at 18, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7,2017)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Eighth Report to Court].
226 Plaintiffs' Sixth Report to Court, supra note 30, at 24.
2271d.
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nonracial factors did not explain the deep racial disparities in stop-and-frisk
practices. 228 Further, of all frisks, 79% were of blacks, 11% were of whites, and
10% were of Latinos, and 1 in 6.4 stops of blacks resulted in a frisk while the
rate for whites was 1 for every 15.2 stops. 229 There was also significant variation
by race in the share of stops lacking reasonable suspicion, which ranged from
31% each for whites and Latinos to 35% for blacks.230 For frisks without
reasonable suspicion, the rates were 47% for whites, 57% for blacks, and 62%
for Latinos.231 The 2017 data show some limited improvement with respect to
racial disparities (driven in part by the reduction in the overall number of stops
and in the number of stops without reasonable suspicion). 2 32
V. PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES
In the ongoing debate over the most appropriate Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment standards for assessing stops and frisks, relatively little attention
has been paid to the significance of stop-and-frisk data on the predictive value
of the kinds of conduct and other factors that have been recognized by courts as
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.
We believe that data analysis provides a highly reliable basis for empirical
evaluation of the factors that courts have identified as relevant to the issue of
reasonable suspicion. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has resorted to
"common sense" and "reason" in determining the inferential power of these
factors. 233 But even if there seems to be a basis to believe that certain types of
228 Id at 27-29.
229 1d at 25.
230 Idat 30-31.
231 Id. at 31. Among other reports on stop-and-frisk practices is a 2014 Department of
Justice investigation of the Newark Police Department (NPD). The DOJ reported that for the
period from January 2009 through June 2012, there were approximately 39,000 pedestrian
stops documented by the NPD. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE
DEPARTMENT 8 (July 2014). Of these stops, 6,200 (15.8%) had no reason provided by the
officer, and a study of a random sample of the rest of the stops showed that 75% were without
legal justification based on the officer's stated reasons for the stop. Id at 8-9. Thus, 93% of
the stops appeared to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id at 9 n.7. The population
of Newark is 54% black, but they comprised 80% of all stops or a stop rate of 2.5 times
higher than whites. Id at 16. Further, when stopped, blacks were 2.7 times more likely to be
searched and 3.1 times more likely to be frisked than whites, yet the hit rates for these
searches and frisks were no greater for blacks than for whites. Id at 20.
232 See Plaintiffs' Eighth Report to Court, supra note 225, at 4.
23 3 See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (taking into account the fact that the arresting officer had searched
approximately 2000 cars for narcotics in determining whether his search satisfied the Fourth
Amendment, but without reference to his hit rate); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983)
("The corroboration of [a] letter's predictions ... suffice[d] for the practical, common-sense
judgment called for in making a probable-cause determination."); United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes
deductions ... that might well elude an untrained person.").
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behavior and observations provide a rational ground for reasonable suspicion,
where empirical evidence does not support the unexamined "common sense,"
courts should carefully review the predictive quality of these factors. This is
particularly the case where categorical judgments for assessing Fourth
Amendment individualized suspicion standards are based on conduct that can
often be entirely innocent in nature. 234
The same is true for the Supreme Court's view that police experience leads
to a special expertise regarding judgments as to reasonable suspicion and
probable cause. In Terry and many other cases, the Court has stressed the
"experience" factor and has given great deference to officers who testify that
their experience informed their decision-making. 235 To be sure, experience can
provide insight and special knowledge, but where data demonstrates that the
professed expertise does not yield the expected results, there is no basis for
broad deference. Indeed, the Court's earlier insight into the dangers of deferring
to officers "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime" 236 may provide a more accurate benchmark for analysis. 237
These empirical judgments will require comprehensive and reliable data. As
discussed above, there is an expanding universe of stop-and-frisk data,
particularly in large urban police departments, and as demands for transparency
and accountability of policing agencies grow, it is likely that the data base will
continue to expand. These data have provided significant insight on the issues
of whether police have the requisite reasonable suspicion to support stops and
frisks and whether racially disproportionate stop-and-frisk practices are
explainable on grounds other than race-in other words, on the critical issue of
intentional race discrimination barred by the Equal Protection Clause. 238
Beyond the use of data to determine overall compliance of stop-and-frisk
programs with constitutional standards, some courts have recognized the
relevance of empirical evidence in providing a more particularized Fourth
Amendment analysis of the reasons provided for stops and frisks. Thus, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that flight in a high-crime area
in Boston was not sufficient grounds for a Terry stop because that stop data in
Boston showed substantial and intentional racial disparities in stop-and-frisk
rates of black men in that city. 239 As the court stated:
234 See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme
Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 975,
976, 989 (1998).
235 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see also, e.g, Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52
n.2 (1979).
236 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
237 For a comprehensive analysis of the police expertise issue, see Lvovsky, supra note
90, at 2026, and see also Josh Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. PA. L. REv. 129, 204-05
(2017).
23 8 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 570-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see
also AYREs & BOROWSKY, supra note 207, at 27-28; LAMBERTH, supra note 193, at 7-9.23 9 Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342-43 (Mass. 2016); see also People v.
Horton, 78 N.E.3d 489, 504 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (adopting the analysis of the Warren court
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[T]he finding that black males in Boston are disproportionately and repeatedly targeted
for [stop-and-frisk] encounters suggests a reason for flight totally unrelated to
consciousness of guilt.... Given this reality for black males in the city of Boston, a
judge should, in appropriate cases, consider the report's findings in weighing flight as
a factor [of the reasonable suspicion issue].24 0
In another setting, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
fact that a car had been "re-painted" does not provide reasonable suspicion that
it had been stolen. 24 1 The court noted that because the State provided no
empirical data to support its contention that re-painted cars are likely stolen
vehicles, the color discrepancy between the car and vehicle registration was
insufficient to show probable cause. 242 In large part, however, courts without
access to empirical data accept subjective judgments regarding behavioral
patterns to find reasonable suspicion. 243
Hit-rate data has the power of informing the inquiry into the predictive value
a number of the factors that courts have credited as relevant on the issue of
whether a stop and/or frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion.244 Hit rates
are available with respect to stops and separately with respect to frisks, but for
the reasons that follow we focus on the frisk data as the most reliable. The
effectiveness of stops can be measured in part by the percentage of cases in
which police seize contraband, make arrests, or issue citations or summonses.
And using these metrics, the hit rates in various cities is low as an absolute
numerical matter. Thus, in New York City for the years 2004-2012, during
which the police made over four million stops, they effectuated arrests or issued
citations in approximately 12% of the stops.245 Similar results are shown in
Philadelphia, where in the first half of 2014 approximately 7.5% of the stops
in Chicago), appeal denied andjudgment vacated, No. 122461,2017 WL 5635931 (111. Nov.
22, 2017).
240 Warren, 58 N.E.3d at 342.
241 United States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2013).
242 Id
243 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 494, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (counting nervousness as a factor contributing
to a finding of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1286, 1292-
93 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a suspect's evasive or erratic movements are part of the
totality of the circumstances in determining probable cause); United States v. Logan, 526
F. App'x 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (considering presence in a high-crime area); United States
v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that seeing individuals sitting in a car
for an extended period may add to reasonable suspicion); United States v. Himmelwright,
406 F. Supp. 889, 892-93 (S.D. Fla. 1975), affd, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that
a suspect's "unusually calm" demeanor supported the finding of reasonable suspicion);
Bambauer, supra note 36, at 505.
244 See Fagan, supra note 56, at 84 (arguing that factors that would establish probable
cause under the Fourth Amendment are more likely to be predictors of criminal conduct than
those just sufficient for reasonable suspicion).
245 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 546, 558, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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resulted in arrests or citations. 246 Far fewer cases resulted in the seizure of
weapons or other contraband. 247
While this data suggest that the predictive power of court-validated stop-
and-frisk factors is very low, the data can be misleading from two different
directions. On the one hand, since the hit rate includes arrests or citations for
post-stop conduct or new information unrelated to the stop (for example, the
existence of an outstanding warrant, or criminal conduct such as an assault on
the officer after the stop), a hit rate measured by whether the stop resulted in an
arrest would be artificially high. On the other hand, the lack of an arrest or
seizure of contraband does not necessarily prove that the stop or frisk was
illegal. First, police may exercise discretion, particularly for low level offenses,
simply to issue a warning and not to take any official action even where there
are grounds to do so. Second, in many stops supported by reasonable suspicion,
there may be no permissible sanction, as it turns out that the suspicious conduct
was not criminal in nature. And third, many legitimate stops will not be expected
to yield contraband or weapons (for example, quality of life stops, disturbances,
curfew stops). Thus, a low hit rate for stops does not necessarily mean that the
officers did not have good cause for their intervention. To be sure, low hit rates
raise a number of questions about the benefits and costs of stop-and-frisk
practices and ought to be considered very carefully by police departments as to
the impact of stops and frisks both on crime control and on police-community
relations. 248
The same problems do not arise in the hit-rate analysis for frisks. Under the
Terry doctrine, frisks can only be conducted where the officer has reasonable
suspicion that the person they have stopped is armed and dangerous. This
standard allows the officer to consider the reason for the stop, other information
known about the suspect, and observations made at or after the stop that would
provide grounds for a reasonable officer to believe that the person was armed
and dangerous. 249 Reasonable suspicion to stop does not automatically provide
grounds for a frisk; indeed, many stops are for quality of life offenses that would
not justify a frisk without more observations indicating that the person was
armed.250 Thus, assuming that the officer asserts that the person stopped is
246 Plaintiffs' Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 18, Bailey
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Fifth
Report to Court].
247 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Plaintiffs' Seventh Report to Court, supra note 30, at
7-9.
24 8 The issue of the "effectiveness" of stop-and-frisk practices in terms of crime
reduction and police-community relations, is much disputed. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note
31, at 1504-05; Rudovsky, supra note 31, at 126.
249 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-27 (1968).25 0 See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.6(a) (5th ed. 2012); see also
Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In the first place, if the frisk is justified in
order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have
constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person,
including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a
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armed and dangerous, the hit rate is a powerful tool in assessing the factors cited
by officers in support of this belief. One would expect that truthful assertions
would yield weapons on more than a very occasional basis, and, if not, there is
good reason for courts to use the empirical data, as opposed to common sense,
to determine which factors can be used by officers. 251
Existing data provides strong grounds for doubting the predictive value of
many of the factors regularly cited by officers in support of their belief that a
suspect is armed and dangerous. First, on a macro level, the hit rate for all frisks
in departments that have collected comprehensive data on stop-and-frisk
practices shows a hit rate that rarely exceeds 1-2%.252 Thus, in Philadelphia,
data for the years 2012-2016 show a frisk hit rate for weapons of approximately
1%.253 In New York City, the hit rate for frisks over the period 2004-2012 was
1.5%.254
On a more particularized basis, examination of the reasons that officers give
for engaging in frisks can yield significant insight when viewed in relationship
to hit rates. Since frisks may target weapons only, one would think that officers
would rely on factors that most frequently result in the seizure of a weapon.
And, no doubt, officers using "common sense" have relied on factors they
believe are strongly predictive. Thus, an observation of a suspicious weapon-
shaped bulge under a suspect's clothing seems unlikely to indicate anything
else. But this is where actual data-as opposed to "common sense"
assumptions-are perhaps most surprising. The data show that certain factors
regularly reported by police, such as observation of a "bulge," a suspect not
being cooperative, a suspect having their hands in their pockets, presence in a
high-crime neighborhood, acting nervous or making furtive movements, and
"flight" are poor predictors of whether one is armed and dangerous, yet the
courts have regularly credited these explanations in sustaining police frisks.255
In almost all cases, "'bulges' turn out to be cell phones or wallets," and the
policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first
have a right not to avoid him but to be in his presence.").
251 We stress the importance of understanding the significance of this empirical data
only on the assumption that the officer has accurately reported the basis for the frisk. No
doubt, there are instances of false allegations of conduct or observations that could support
a frisk.252 See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Seventh Report to Court, supra note 30, at 19.
253 Plaintiffs' Seventh Report to Court, supra note 30, at 19; Plaintiffs' Sixth Report to
Court, supra note 30, at 19; Plaintiffs' Fifth Report to Court, supra note 246, at 32; Plaintiffs'
Fourth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 17, Bailey v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013). The hit rate is likely even less than this
figure given that a number of frisks go unreported. See Plaintiffs' Seventh Report to Court,
supra note 30, at 19.
254 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
2 55 See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (flight and presence in a
high-crime area); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977) (per curiam) (bulges);
see also LAFAVE, supra note 250, § 9.6(a).
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other triggering factors are also very weak indicators of criminal activity. 2 56
Thus, in audits conducted in 2014-2016, of 220 frisks based on a "bulge," only
one weapon was seized, a hit rate of less than 0.5%.257
Frisks conducted where officers reported that suspects failed to take their
hands out of their pockets, were not "cooperative," engaged in furtive
movements, or were stopped in high-crime areas were similarly unproductive.
In the 2016 audit, frisks based on these factors in 288 cases yielded only a single
weapon. 2 58 The fact that so few frisks lead to the recovery of a weapon (in the
second half of 2016, 722 frisks yielded only 14 weapons) 259 raises serious
questions as to whether the police are accurately reporting what they observe
and, if so, whether the grounds that the courts have regularly approved for
conducting frisks are reliable indicators of weapon possession. The data show
otherwise.
The data from New York City are strikingly similar.260 A perceptive study
of the NYPD stop-and-frisk practices focused on stops that were based on
reports of weapons to determine the "stop-level hit rate" (SHR) for these
encounters.2 6 1 For the period 2008-2010, there were close to 475,000 such
stops, with only a small number of stops resulting in a seizure of a weapon. 262
The study sought to determine whether there were certain factors that were of a
significantly higher predictive quality in terms of actual weapon possession. The
study employed logistic regression analysis to identify the factors from the
2008-2010 stops that were most productive.26 3 These included the
demographics of the person stopped, location of the stop, date and time of day,
the "recorded reason" for the stop (e.g., furtive movements, bulge, high-crime
area), officer observations, and the reliability of third-party sources.26 4 This
regression showed that in 80% of the stops, there was less than a 3% chance of
finding a weapon, and in 43% of the stops there was less than 1% chance of
discovering a weapon.2 65 Not surprisingly, the least helpful indicators of
weapon possession were amorphous factors like "furtive movements." 26 6
Moreover, the stops in which there was a very low SHR were also highly racially
256 See Plaintiffs' Seventh Report to Court, supra note 30, at 19.
257 Plaintiffs' Seventh Report to Court, supra note 30, at 19 (no weapons); Plaintiffs'
Sixth Report to Court, supra note 30, at 19-20 (no weapons); Plaintiffs' Fifth Report to
Court, supra note 246, at 19 (one weapon).
258 Plaintiffs' Seventh Report to Court, supra note 30, at 19.2 5 9 Id at 9.
26 0 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
261 Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 83, at 187; see also Goel
et al., Personalized Risk Assessments, supra note 83, at 120.262 Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 83, at 211-13.263 1d at 211-12.
264 1d at 212.
265Id. at 188, 214, 218.
266Id at 188.
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disparate: 49% of these stops were of blacks, 34% of Latinos, and 19% of
whites.267
Reliance on more reliable factors significantly increased the rate of
recovery: 66% of all stops were responsible for 90% of the weapon seizures,
and 8% of all stops were responsible for half of these seizures.268 Using this
data, the authors of the study created a model to estimate the ex ante likelihood
that the stops in 2011 and 2012 would turn up a weapon. 269 The results strongly
supported the authors' thesis: the factors that were present in cases in the 2008-
2010 data base that more often led to a weapon seizure were predictive of a
similar SHR in 2011-2012.270 For example, the factors in 7,310 cases in the
base study that led to a 5% SHR led to the same 5% SHR for the later years. 271
The point, of course, was that data analysis could lead the NYPD (and other
departments) to implement better stop-and-frisk practices. But regardless of
whether police departments will use data to enhance their programs (and there
is good reason to be skeptical on this point), our view is that courts must engage
in this analysis to properly define the boundaries of Terry stops. Surely, if
empirical evidence shows that certain factors that the courts have previously
credited as "common sense" grounds for believing one is armed and dangerous
have no or very minimal predictive value, reconsideration of their validity is in
order.272
It may be the case that, even with very low hit rates, certain conduct (for
example, suspicion of violent criminal conduct or of weapon possession based
on credible sources) should continue to be a basis for a frisk, but with respect to
more circumstantial evidence such as bulges, hands in pockets, furtive
movements, and high-crime areas, common sense should yield to empirical data.
As discussed, in numerous other areas, courts have updated their validation
analysis given new data and new information, and there is very good reason to
do so here, where so many persons are adversely affected by practices that may
bear little or no relation to their purported goals.
Of course, if empirical data is considered, there is a very important
normative question regarding the appropriate hit rate for weapons that would
satisfy the standard of reasonable suspicion. The debate regarding quantification
267Id. at 215.
268 Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 83, at 219.
2691d at 187.
27 0 Id at 212-13.
271Id at 213.
272 While we suggest that the data provide grounds for reconsidering the factors that the
courts have justified as grounds for stops and frisks, there are other ways in which the data
might impact Fourth Amendment doctrine and litigation. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L.
REv. 623, 625-26, 674 n.294 (2014) (discussing that data can provide stronger arguments
that an officer's impermissible actions should result in suppression under the Herring v.
United States rationale limiting suppression to "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." (quoting Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009))).
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or not for probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations has centered
on both the theoretical issue of whether such analysis is reliable under the Fourth
Amendment and the more data-driven question of determining statistical
minimums in assessing probable cause and reasonable suspicion issues.273
The Supreme Court has resisted quantifying the concepts of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause and even where it has considered hit rate data, the
Court has provided no consistent set of controlling metrics. 274 With respect to
probable cause, the Court has required a showing of a "fair probability" that the
facts alleged show criminal conduct or the presence of relevant evidence275 but
has not specified where on the spectrum of probability that showing is
located. 276 Commentators, including judges (in surveys), have suggested a
range of metrics.277
Reasonable suspicion, by definition, requires something less in terms of
probabilities. But whether that is in the 20-25% range or even as low as 5-10%,
current data on frisks consistently show a far lower hit rate in many studies of
no more than 1-2%, a rate we believe is so low as to be outside any reasonable
273 See, e.g., Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK L. REV. 569,
570 (2007); Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74
MIss. L.J. 279, 295 (2004); Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause
Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 794-95 (2013); Jon B. Gould & Stephen D.
Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assesssing Police Behavior Under the US Constitution, 3
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 315, 316-17 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding
ofSearch and Seizure Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 608-10 (2016); Kerr, supra note 50, at
143; Kinports, supra note 50, at 78; Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness ofProbable Cause,
81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 995-97 (2003); Meares & Harcourt, supra note 31, at 735; Minzner,
supra note 50, at 951-52; Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 87; Lawrence Rosenthal, The
Crime Drop and the Fourth Amendment: Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence ofSearch and
Seizure, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 641, 669 (2005); Rudovsky, supra note 31, at
119.
274 This may be the result of different analysis for different Fourth Amendment contexts,
and in particular with respect to the degree of intrusiveness of the police intervention. See,
e.g., Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1059 (2013) (permitting use of drug detecting dogs
without a showing of field accuracy or error rates); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32, 35, 48 (2000) (finding unconstitutional the use of checkpoints to interdict drugs on
highways, even though there was a 9% hit rate in these random stops); Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990) (sustaining DUI check points where only 1.6%
of drivers stopped were arrested for DUI); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
554, 566-67 (1976) (immigration check point was permissible with only a 0.12% hit rate
(171 of 146,000 cars)).
275 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
2 76 See Goldberg, supra note 273, at 801 & n.62.
277 See, e.g., Minzner, supra note 50, at 915 (advocating use of historic hit rates in
assessing individual officer allegations of probable cause); C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of
Proof Degrees ofBelief Quanta ofEvidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1293, 1327-28 (1982) (citing a 1981 survey of 166 federal judges who quantified
probable cause at an average of 46% (but ranging from 10-90%) and 164 federal judges who
quantified reasonable suspicion at an average of31%).
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quantification of suspicion. Even if a rate as low as 5% was deemed acceptable,
the current rates of 1-2% (and sometimes lower) are clearly not sufficient.2 78
All of this takes us back to our original focus. Collection, analysis, and wide
use of data as a basis for public policy and legal decision-making has become
more common. Empirical bases for legal and policy choices have become the
norm in a growing number of areas including the criminal justice arena, as
shown by the proliferation of predictive risk assessments tools for setting bail
and assessing sentences.
In this era, the continued use of unexamined "common sense" assumptions
to validate police practices when data can be used to empirically test factual
propositions is anachronistic. Data testing of frisk hit rates in which officers use
"common sense" signs of the presence of weapons to justify frisks do not
support the predictive efficacy of those "common sense" indicators; something
more profound than "the way we've always done it" is at play. Courts should
not participate in this type of willful avoidance of reality.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have seen how data analysis has become a valuable tool across many
aspects of American law. This makes it all the more striking that the Supreme
Court and lower courts have failed to grasp the significance of the available
empirical data and the role it can play regarding judicial judgments of
reasonable suspicion and particularly Terry frisks. Hit-rate data on frisks is but
one striking example. There is strong evidence that the hit rate analysis
discussed here can provide police departments with critical information
regarding the most salient predictors of criminal conduct and weapon
possession. Properly used, this would lead to fewer civilian stops and frisks and
higher rates of weapon seizures and other legitimate law enforcement actions.
Equally important, big data regarding police law enforcement practices and
crime rates can provide the government and the citizenry with information
integral to the most basic questions of law enforcement methods and democratic
community participation. 279 In jurisdictions in which comprehensive data is
maintained, the debate about stop-and-frisk practices, crime control, and racial
and procedural justice takes place in a fact-based world. The legal standards
278 In United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412-13 (2012), the Court ruled that the use
of a GPS device that tracked the defendant's car movements for twenty-eight days, 24/7, was
unconstitutional in the absence of a valid search warrant. Justice Alito wrote a concurring
opinion (joined by four Justices) that supported a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to such long range and intrusive surveillance and left open the question as to the
threshold point where privacy interests prevailed. Id. at 429-31 (Alito, J., concurring).
Presumably, surveillance for one hour or even one day might not implicate a reasonable
expectation of privacy, but the difficulty in making decisions along the time spectrum should
not cause a court not to act where the time frame enables the government to collect a large
amount of personal information sufficient to objectively determine that there is a legitimate
expectation of privacy in that context. Id. at 412 (majority opinion).279 FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 27-28, 199-201.
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employed by the courts should move the system in the same direction.
Comprehensive data regarding stops and frisks, including hit rates, racial
disparities, and concurrent crime rates, can yield significant information about
best policing practices and the impact on crime rates and the community-police
relations of stop-and-frisk practices. This empirical data should inform both
policymakers and the courts in their consideration of police interventions.
